NAA: MP1049/1, 1918/066, pages 491 and 492 is a letter from Major E. L. Piesse, Director of Military Intelligence, to the Navy Office, informing them of the progress of the Army's aerial reconnaissance of south Gippsland. Unfortunately,

The aeroplane used in this reconnaissance has been unserviceable since 24th inst. No information has yet been received as to when this aeroplane can fly again.

More interestingly (and the reason why I cite this in my article), Piesse includes extracts from the reports made by 'the O/C [Officer Commanding] Air Reconnaissance' (Captain Frank McNamara VC), who apparently has not been given any detailed instructions as to what he should be looking for and accordingly has come up with his own criteria. Over the sea, the general idea is to 'Examine decks of all boats which may be capable of carrying a seaplane'. The bigger the vessel the more attention it receives:

1. 'Fishing craft': report location only
2. 'Small steamers or wind propelled craft': 'Report time, position, direction of steering, description'
3. 'Ships of higher tonnage': as above, 'but examine more closely, particularly the decks'

Any ships passing in sight of the Wilson's Promontory lighthouse will be reported 'and when AEROPLANE-SHIP RECOGNITION SIGNAL has been arranged there will be an additional check'. If the enemy is sighted, then

Upon seeing hostile ship, aeroplane, or submarine, we will be able to convey information rapidly to ground station or ship, provided the distance is not beyond range. (A W/T set is being got ready to fit to the machine).

In the case of 'Floating mines', 'action taken, time, position' would be reported. In the case of 'Hostile aircraft', 'Engagement with which would be reported on COMBAT-IN-THE-AIR REPORT' (!) Finally, a lookout is being kept for 'SIGNALLING by persons of enemy sympathy', whether to 'hostile ships' or 'hostile aircraft', paying close attention to 'changes in the distribution of smoke fires' and 'ground on which [signal?] strips etc. could be seen from the air'. So these ad hoc criteria tell us what the airmen, at least, were looking for. It's interesting that submarines are mentioned, as these have previously been mentioned in connection with the aerial reconnaissance; but there are one or two phantom ones lurking about.
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NAA: MP1049/1, 1918/066, pages 701 to 709 is a copy of Directorate of Military Intelligence report HB53, 'Aircraft, lights and objects reported seen in the air'. Copies have been sent to various District Naval Officers and the commanders of HMA Ships Brisbane, Encounter and Protector (presumably DMI sent it to the various military district HQs, as well). It consists of two parts. The first is 'a brief diary' of reports received of 'objects seen in the air', between 1 March and 27 April 1918, excluding 'Reports proved to be false'. This is a list of 41 separate mystery aeroplane reports, including place, date, and a summary (and file reference), beginning with Nubeena, Tasmania:

On the night of the 6th/7th of March and on eight successive nights, searchlights and moving lights in the sky were reported by Mr George E. Clarke of NUBEENA.

and ending with Grafton, New South Wales:

Police at GRAFTON report:- 'Informed on good authority that an aeroplane, the body painted white and the planes black, was seen at GRAFTON on 26th instant flying in a north-easterly direction.

A number of the sightings previously discussed appear here: Nyang (no. 4), Terrigal (no. 5), Macarthur (no. 7), Maffra (no. 11), Toora (no. 15), Bunbury (no. 17), Cape Leeuwin (no. 18), Christmas Hills (no. 19) and Ballarat West (no. 23). The last of these took place on 20 April, so the remaining 18 reports date from the last week, demonstrating how fast the mystery aeroplanes are multiplying. (Since the sightings are listed according to when they took place, not when they were reported -- which is why Nyang is at no. 4 -- this will actually be an understatement.)
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NAA: MP1049/1, 1918/066, page 459 is a copy of a telegram sent from the Navy Office to the Admiralty, London; Commander in Chief, China; Senior Naval Officer, Wellington; and Captain in Charge, Sydney. It reads:

Reports are being received daily of Aeroplanes seen in Victoria and South Australia. Close investigations being made. Latest reports are from Port Lincoln 23rd April and district at back of Cape Nelson. King Island indicated as a possible base. Rockets and other suspicious signals seen. Two and sometimes three aeroplanes sighted at same time. Australian aeroplanes are scouting at Corner Inlet and from BEGA about 50 miles north of GABO. No ships overdue or other indications of a raider. Aeroplanes may be in connection with some inland organisation.
"BRISBANE" ordered to Bass Straits [sic].

This is big. This is the Royal Australian Navy telling the Royal Navy: look, just FYI, we're not completely sure what's going on yet, and nothing has actually happened, but it looks like we might have a problem here. There are all these aeroplanes being reported from Victoria and South Australia, which could be from a raider, or perhaps more likely, might be evidence of an 'inland organisation' or 'a possible base' on King Island, between Tasmania and Victoria. We are looking into it with our own aircraft, and we're sending our best available ship, HMAS Brisbane, to the area...
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NAA: MP1049/1, 1918/066, page 403 is a copy of a telegram from the District Naval Officer (DNO), Fremantle, Western Australia. He is passing on information from the editor of the Bunbury Herald (by way of the military censor) that at Bunbury

a girl reports having seen a balloon or zeppelin at 2200 21st April in direction of Picton. Observing that at 2200 it was not daylight the weather conditions stormy and dark.

It doesn't seem like this was published in the Bunbury News at the time. Some other telgrams add further information: NAA: MP1049/1, 1918/066, page 402, a decoded telegram from military intelligence at Perth, that the girl was 14 (and also that Cape Leeuwin lighthouse reported seeing an 'aerial object' on the same date); NAA: MP1049/1, 1918/066, page 404, a telegram from the Fremantle censor, that she worked for W. S. Hales. But they also both say that the girl's sighting took place at 6am, not 10pm as the DNO reported; the former says it happened on 18 April, not 21 April.

In my article, I used this as a more or less random example of one of the many mystery aeroplane reports beginning to arrive on the desks of bemused intelligence officers at this time -- though the fact that it took place in Western Australia, rather than Victoria, also helps to show the geographical spread of the reports. I must confess to being a bit casual in my referencing here: whereas I have quoted from and hence cited the DNO's telegram as above, in the text I also give the girl's age and the date as 18 April, which are from the military intelligence telegram. Properly speaking, I should have cited that instead, or as well. It was probably in the interests of concision that I didn't use both sources (given that it's not a particularly important example), and I suspect that I couldn't resist quoting the DNO's telegram because it uses the word 'zeppelin'! Aeroplanes are one thing, but whatever the girl saw it certainly wasn't one of those.

NAA: MP1049/1, 1918/066, page 468 is a copy of an order to the Officer Commanding, Central Flying School (i.e. Point Cook), from Major A. J. Boase on behalf of the Chief of the General Staff (i.e. Major-General J. G. Legge). It orders the detachment of two aircraft:

(a) one aeroplane to TOORA, South GIPPSLAND or to some other suitable place in that vicinity, and
(b) one aeroplane by H.M.A.S. "PROTECTOR" to TWOFOLD BAY.

Each aeroplane is to be sent today with 'the necessary complement of air mechanics and a Lewis Gunner with one Lewis gun and reserve ammunition', the guns themselves (with 4000 rounds Mk VI and 1500 rounds Mk VII ammunition) to be supplied to CFS from HQ 3rd Military District. Two relief pilots (Lieutenant M. J. Clarke, RFC, and Lieutenant W. B. Tunbridge, AFC) have also been assigned.

The pilot of the aeroplane sent to TOORA will reconnoitre WILSON'S PROMONTORY and the vicinity for hostile raider or seaplanes and will take his orders from, and report to, "Defence, Melbourne" [the following is added in handwriting], subject to special instructions issued by D.M.I. [Director, Military Intelligence, i.e. Major Hogan]

The pilot of the aeroplane detached with H.M.A.S. "PROTECTOR" will take instructions from, and report to the Navy.

It should be obvious why I cite this in my article: it is unambiguous evidence that the Australian military did not just monitor the mystery aeroplane reports (as the existence of NAA: MP1049/1, 1918/066 itself demonstrates), but that it interpreted them to mean that there was a possible threat to Australian security and therefore undertook action to locate this threat: namely, an armed aerial reconnaissance along the Victorian coast extending east from Gippsland into the southern coast of NSW. And the order came from the top: Major-General Legge, the Chief of the General Staff, is the most senior officer in the Army. So this is very significant for establishing the impact of the Australian mystery aeroplane panic. It also shows how the military authorities were interpreting the sightings at this time: they aren't sending any aircraft to the west, which is where the mystery aeroplanes were first seen; they're sending them to the east, which is where they are starting to be seen. This makes sense if you are thinking in terms of a raider (with seaplane) sailing along the coast -- it's not going to be hanging around, so you need to send your forces to where you think it's going to be, not where it was.
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NAA: MP1049/1, 1918/066, page 183 is a report from Constable G. T. Moyle of the Hamilton police station, in the Western District of Victoria. It concerns 'an aeroplane' seen near Macarthur in the early hours of 11 April 1918 by John Sutton, a drover. Sutton had told several people in Hamilton of his strange encounter, but had not yet informed the police because 'he was in charge of a mob of cattle and that he could not get away, and he though [sic] people would make fun out of it'. Nevertheless, Moyle finds him to be 'of good character and most reliable', and his account matches what he had been saying in Hamilton.
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