From blitzkrieg to blitz

[Cross-posted at Revise and Dissent.]

The German bombing of London and other British cities between September 1940 and May 1941 is referred to as "the Blitz", a contemporary term which, if not actually coined by the press, was certainly popularised by it. Blitz is short for blitzkrieg, German for "lightning war", which was the label given to the spectacularly mobile armoured offensives, strongly supported by tactical bombing, which led to the rapid conquests of Poland and France. Sometimes it is suggested that it was inappropriate or inaccurate to apply a word having to do with fast-paced ground combat, involving Panzers and Stukas, to a fundamentally different type of warfare, a strategic bombing campaign lasting nine months in which no territory was exchanged and no soldiers even saw each other. For example, after noting the popular origins of blitz, A. J. P. Taylor added as a footnote:

Popular parlance was, of course, wrong. 'Blitz' was lightning war. This was the opposite.1

The Wikipedia page on the Blitz says:

The German military doctrine of speed and surprise was described as Blitzkrieg, literally lightning war, from which the British use of blitz was derived. While German air-supported attacks on Poland, France, the Netherlands and other countries may be described as blitzkrieg, the prolonged strategic bombing of London did not fit the term.

I'd like to suggest here that while it's true that the Blitz wasn't a lightning war, nonetheless it was a blitzkrieg. Confused? Hopefully I can explain ...

Firstly, note that initially blitz and blitzkrieg were synonymous terms. So immediately after the first big raids on London on 7 September 1940, the Daily Express was already using the familiar term: 'Blitz bombing of London goes on all night'.2 But at the same time, the Spectator was calling it a blitzkrieg:

The full purpose of the Blitzkrieg may have been more fully revealed by the time these lines are read. Its immediate object no doubt is to break morale.3

(Blitzkrieg seems to have been more common at first, but after a month or so it was replaced by blitz.) I think this is significant, because it shows that the British didn't think of the Blitz as something fundamentally different from blitzkrieg. It was the blitzkrieg, as applied to the attempted conquest of Britain -- which, being separated from the Continent by the English Channel, obviously wasn't going to play out in exactly the same way as it did in Poland and the West.

Interestingly, the word blitzkrieg was being thrown around even before the Blitz began: so in mid-August, in what we normally think of as the Battle of Britain, the New Statesman thought that

It is still too early to judge whether the steadily increasing severity of the air-attacks on this country marks the beginning of a Blitzkrieg or is the opening stage of a long process of beleaguerment.4

Since this blitzkrieg is posed as an alternative to a slow siege, it does at least imply speed. But it still doesn't sound like the traditional blitzkrieg: where are the onrushing tanks, the surprise paratroop landings, the columns of weary refugees trudging along dusty country roads being strafed by Messerschmitts? The missing element is the anticipated German invasion of Britain, thought most likely to take place in mid-September. The Spectator thought that even though the RAF remained undefeated, a desperate Hitler could still attempt invasion without air superiority:

In such a scheme the intimidation of London would play a natural part, in the double hope that disorganisation might be created at the vital centre and forces be detached to defend the capital that should properly be deployed to repel aggression.5

So, in the Spectator's view, London was not being bombed just to kill civilians or undermine morale, but to create chaos at a critical place and a critical time. A landing in Kent or Sussex could be only days away, and panic in London would greatly aid the invaders.

How is all this like the blitzkrieg? A leading article from the Manchester Guardian explains it best, even though it doesn't mention the word:

By bombing London [Germany] aims at cutting off supplies, dislocating life and shaking the individual nerve, even (if her newspapers are to be believed) at driving the population out into the countryside -- a success that she has had elsewhere but will not have with us -- and at diminishing the military production of the country. The comparison is rough, but Hitler is trying to do in London as a prelude to invasion what, by bombing, parachutists, and troop carriers, he succeeded in doing at Rotterdam and the Hague as a support to the attack of his army from the east. Confusion on the ground produced by air attack is one ally that he desires for his army just as the actual defeat of the opposing air force -- in Holland, as in Poland, he destroyed it -- is another.6

So the blitzkrieg was being carried out against Britain, just as it had been against Poland, Belgium, Holland and France -- only more slowly. Very roughly, here's how the blitzkrieg was imagined in Britain in 1940:

  1. Destroy the defending air force and gain air superiority. In May 1940, the elimination of the Belgian Air Force in the first few hours of fighting, for example. From August, the Battle of Britain (though of course this was a German defeat).
  2. Attack cities and communications behind the front line from the air and disrupt the defence. In May, the bombardment of Rotterdam; also the masses of refugees streaming away from the front. In September, the Blitz.
  3. Advance rapidly with mobile ground and airborne forces to encircle and defeat the defending forces. In May/June, the Battle of France, including Sedan and the Sichelschnitt. In September, Operation Sealion.
  4. Victory!

So blitz is not a corruption of blitzkrieg as the latter term was understood in Britain at the time. Of course, as the Blitz wore on, autumn turned into winter and people realised that Hitler wasn't coming -- yet -- the phrase took on a life of its own and came to refer exclusively to the aerial bombardment of cities by the Luftwaffe. But useful though this definition is, it unfortunately detaches the Blitz from the bigger picture and obscures the continuities and connections between it and the Battle of Britain, and Sealion.

I've disregarded the question of whether any of this bears any relation to the "real" blitzkrieg, or indeed the actual course of events; as ever I'm interested in what people thought was happening more than what was actually going on. But it turns out that blitzkrieg is itself a problematic concept, and it's problematic in quite an interesting way. I'll examine that in a later post.

CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License. Permissions beyond the scope of this license may be available at http://airminded.org/copyright/.

  1. A. J. P. Taylor, English History 1914-1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992 [1965]), 501. []
  2. Daily Telegraph, 9 September 1940, p. 1; quoted in OED entry for "blitz". []
  3. "A decisive hour", Spectator, 13 September 1940, 260. Emphasis in original. []
  4. "The two blockades", New Statesman, 17 August 1940, 149. []
  5. "A decisive hour", 260. []
  6. Manchester Guardian, 18 September 1940, p. 4. Emphasis added. []

54 thoughts on “From blitzkrieg to blitz

  1. This may be preempting your next post, but when I was at the West Point summer research seminar last year one of the professors was adamant in refusing to use the term 'Blitzkrieg' - which, as you know, was a Western coinage not originally used by the Wehrmacht itself - because it elided the difference between the two principal German strategies of Kesselschlacht (battle of encirclement) and Bewegungskrieg (war of movement).

  2. Post author

    Yes, that sort of thing is partly why it's a problematic concept, but I'll mostly be taking another tack. Actually, it does seem that blitzkrieg was used in the pre-war German literature (not as an official term, it's true), just for something a bit different to what we now think of as blitzkrieg. Which is what I'll be talking about :)

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  4. I just wanted to add something about a common misconception on the origin of "blitzkrieg," especially the notion that it was coined by Western journalists and that it was unknown to the German army prior to WW II. For a full account, see my article "The Origin of the Term 'Blitzkrieg': Another View," which appeared in the April 1997 issue of The Journal of Military History. First of all, I have never seen any confirmed documentation on who coined the term. I have some ideas described in my article. I found about 30 separate instances in which the word was used in books, magazines, and professional journals prior to WW II. The earliest that I found was the one cited by John Erickson in his book The Road to Stalingrad. He quotes Soviet Marshal Tukhachevsky in early 1937 referring to the blitzkrieg, "which is so propagandized by the Germans." Erickson replied to my inquiry about whether or not Tukhachevsky actually used the German term. Erickson has a copy of the marshal's speech, and the transliteration from the Russian is "blitskrig." Freelance journalist M. W. Fodor used the word "blitzkrieg" in an article entitled "Hitler Will Decide," which appeared in the 10 September 1938 issue of The Nation. As for the Germans, I have a copy of Lt. Col. Viktor Braun's late 1938 article from Militer-Wochenblatt, entitled "Der Strategische Ueberfall." The opening passage reads as follows: "Nach den Zeitungsnachrichten hatten die diesjaehrigen franzoesischen Manoever den Zweck, die Bedeutung des strategischen Ueberfalls--auch Blitzkrieg genant--zu pruefen." I also found in the published Nuremberg War Crimes documents an address by General Georg Thomas, head of the War Economy and Armaments Office of OKW during WW II, to members of the German foreign service, in which he used the word blitzkrieg twice (actually, the genitive case form "Blitzkrieges"). In almost every instance--including the two German examples--prior to WW II, the word had no relation to any tactical doctrine involving airpower and tanks. It was used specifically to describe the knockout blow or, as General Thomas described it, a war of weeks or months.

  5. Post author

    Thanks for commenting, Bill! I don't know if you saw it or not, but I cited your paper in my follow-up post to this one, From knock-out blow to blitzkrieg. I found it to be very interesting and useful.

    Perhaps you could confirm something for me -- when you say 'knockout blow', in the German context do you mean a combined land and air offensive? (Is it a translation of a German term?) If so, was airpower to be deployed in strategic bombardment at all, or just in operational support? The reason I ask is that 'knock-out blow' is a term I use all the time, but in the British context it more or less exclusively referred to a pure, strategic air war (but similarly short, weeks or months). I think they are closely related concepts (the difference being that Britain didn't have to worry so much about offensives on land, being an island), but I'd like to be clear on the differences so I don't elide the two. Thanks again!

  6. Bill Fanning

    Thanks for your reference to my article. As for the "knockout blow," it seems that many writers during the 1920s and 1930s simply used it and expressions such as the French "attaque brusquee and the German "Ueberfall" or "Ueberfallskrieg" in a somewhat vague sense to describe the ability to defeat an enemy in a matter of days or weeks. In most cases, it was used in connection with airpower alone or airpower and mechanized ground forces together. The sense that I got from reading the numerous articles by journalists and military spokesmen, however, was that they did not often seem to know what the term specifically defined. Many of the military writers, for example, Lt. Braun mentioned above, did not believe that a "knockout blow" with airpower alone would be successful, and they also were skeptical of one that included other arms as well. I might add that, starting with J. F. C. Fuller, by the early 1920s it was widely accepted that the next war would begin without a formal declaration of war and that the first strike by an enemy would be by air.

  7. Post author

    Yes, Fuller is one of my chaps, though I'd argue that the trend started a bit earlier than him (Groves in 1922 popularised it, but even he wasn't first). In Britain, the knock-out blow wasn't rigidly defined either, but there was a cluster of characteristics different definitions drew from. And it was all air there -- I've not seen the term used in a military (or naval) context, anyway. It's interesting to get a glimpse of the Continental versions -- thanks once more.

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  9. Peter L. Griffiths

    A crucial question which nobody asks let alone answers is Where did the German bombers come from ? The answer is from about 34 airfields in Northern France which were handed over to the Germans after the French capitulation in June 1940. Without the French capitulation there would have been no bombing of British cities.

  10. Chris Williams

    I'd put it slightly differently: "Without the advance of Army Group A to the Channel Ports, there would have been no bombing of British cities." When the French capitulated on June 16th, the Channel coast up to Cherbourg was already in German hands, and Paris had fallen. 'handed over' is thus more than a tad inaccurate: among other things it demeans the deaths of several scores of thousands of French people who died trying to defend them.

  11. Post author

    What Chris said. Also, the Luftwaffe lost about 1400 aircraft in the six weeks of the campaign against France and the Low Countries. When you compare that with the 1900 it lost over Britain (in about twice the time), it would seem that the French 'capitulation' didn't leave the Luftwaffe in very good shape for its next campaign.

  12. Peter L. Griffiths

    The French capitulation legalised an enforced military situation. If Chris Williams and Brett Holman know of a single instance of the so called French resistance disabling any of the airfields up to 1941, I am sure 20th century historians would be glad to hear of it. A further question is why our own British airforce commanders failed to target these French airfields, which are all mentioned in the Luftwaffe Order of Battle August 1940. The French have yet to produce an official history of world war 2, which might well include the admission that they should never have declared war in September 1939 against a country which became their ally after June 1940.

  13. Chris Williams

    So here's Kesselring, sat in his HQ in the summer of 1940 "Oh, what can I do - I'd like to launch an attack on SE England, but I can't! You see, the French haven't capitulated - all those airfields we've occupied aren't occupied legally, so there's no way that I can use them. Curse the French!"

    Yes, that's what would have happened, for sure.

    I am at a loss to know how to respond the point about 'the so called French resistance'.

    Answer to the "further suggestion": because all the Bomber Command sorties in late summer 1940 were hitting invasion barges (and the ports they were in, but hey) instead?

  14. Just to add to what Chris has said, No. 2 Group was involved in attacks against German airfields in Northern France. However, their success was mixed given that they were ill-equipped for the task and that aircraft that may have escorted them were otherwise engaged in defending the UK.

  15. Post author

    The French capitulation legalised an enforced military situation.

    That's right, so it's actually not true to say, as you initially did, that 'Without the French capitulation there would have been no bombing of British cities'. It was the military situation which enabled the bombing of British cities from French airfields, not the legal one. So I'm not sure what your point is.

    A further question is why our own British airforce commanders failed to target these French airfields, which are all mentioned in the Luftwaffe Order of Battle August 1940.

    What are you suggesting? That the RAF was collaborating with the Germans?

    a country which became their ally after June 1940.

    Not in a military sense, which is why the Axis never got its hands on the French fleet.

  16. Peter L. Griffiths

    Among the numerous further questions which need to be answered is exactly what assistance did the French airfield authorities give to the Luftwaffe to facilitate the bombing of British cities.

  17. I know certain British 'military thinkers' used to have problems accepting that there could be any other enemy than the French, even in the Twentieth Century, but I though they'd all finally exploded with indignation when even the Telegraph stopped printing their rambles.

    Maybe, Peter, what you think is 'a question that needs to be answered' just isn't.

  18. Post author

    Maybe, Peter, what you think is 'a question that needs to be answered' just isn't.

    I wouldn't mind so much, except that he doesn't seem to be actually interested in any of the answers. It's as though merely asking the questions makes his point for him.

  19. Peter L. Griffiths

    I ask the questions because the answers are not generally known. The British attack on French warships at Mers el Kebir and Dakar in July 1940 may have been a motive for closer collaboration between France and Germany. These are all important questions which are not being studied at the modern history departments of British universities. 20th century history seems to have degenerated into glorified fiction.

  20. Chris Williams

    Oddly enough, it was while working in a history department, running a twentieth century history course that has been studied by about five thousand people, I decided to make a radio show on Mers el Kebir. About half a million people listened to that.

    While researching this, I found out about the incredibly heroic efforts of the marin nationale before the capitulation to stop the Germans taking their kit. Engines were dropped into one unfinished destroyer overnight, and it steamed away the next morning, under artillery fire. Interestingly, not only did churchill not mention this, he even claimed that precisely the opposite had happened. Like you, he'd let his prejudices rather than available sources dictate his view of history.

    Shorter: This is History. You want Francophobia - that's two doors down.

  21. Chris: interesting, given Churchill's francophilia; I presume the misrepresentations were to help justify the shelling?

  22. Post author

    Shorter: This is History. You want Francophobia - that's two doors down.

    This!

    And Peter, how do you know that 'These [...] important questions [...] are not being studied at the modern history departments of British universities'? We do in fact know the answers to your questions; you seem rather to be objecting to the fact that nobody agrees with your implications.

  23. Where did this come from? Though I have to say that I'm squirming in excitement at the thought of finally learning whose fault the Blitz really was. I'm holding my breath for Lithuania, which really doesn't get the credit it deserves in Crazyland (heck, even Latvia sometimes gets blamed for the Bolsheviks).

    But I have a feeling it will turn out to be Churchill, again.

  24. Peter L.Griffiths

    Marshall Petain is one of the most under-rated of all the 2nd world war leaders. He successfully projected the image of an antiquated head of state out of touch with the realities. It is not generally recognised that he had previously been Minister of War in 1934 and before that he had been Inspector General of Air Defence, and had supported the creation of an independent airforce for France. He had been on friendly terms with Goering since about 1934. This background could largely explain the absence of any protests from the Vichy Government at the use of the French airfields for bombing British cities. Petain was fully aware of the consequences of putting French airfields to this use.

  25. Goven that German bombers were operating from occupied French territory and not Vichy territory I am not sure that Petain has any influence here. He 'could', and I stress could, have protested to which I suspect German reaction would have been obvious; march into southern France.

    Although he collaborates with Germany, in 1940 France was in no position, other than the Free French forces that escape, to demand anything of the sort. They were a defeated nation.

    I refer you to Chris' comment above...

  26. Post author

    Erik:

    Wrong! It wasn't Lithuania or Churchill, it was Pétain. So now the question which needs to be asked is, when did Pétain start planning the Blitz? My guess is 1908, when the Wrights visited France and demonstrated their flyer to rapt crowds. But there's an outside possibility it was 1897, when the French War Office tested Clément Ader's Avion III. Of course, the modern history departments of British universities aren't researching this question at all, which shows you what they know.

  27. Don't be so quick to dismiss the Lithuanian connection, Brett. Pétain was only a 31 year-old junior officer when he arranged Ader's funding. Clearly there was something more at work here, something so shadowy and diabolical that only Lithuanians could contemplate it.

    And don't get me started on the Lithuanian penetration of the academy.

  28. Peter L. Griffiths

    As Minister of War in 1934, Petain would have had to consider the possibility of war with Britain as well as war with Germany. The airfields could have been designed with this possibility in mind, even though France seemed to have no bombers. It is unfortunate that British strategic thinking did not focus on this.

  29. Chris Williams

    Peter, are you aware of the bomber scare of the early 1920s, in which the British got very worried about the French? Your most recent post would appear to indicate not. Oddly, quite a few modern British historians are aware of this, and it's been mentioned on this blog.

    Keep it up - this is very nearly fun.

  30. "France seemed to have no bombers?" You might want to check this, peter. Because, amazingly enough, it's not actually true.

    One thing that you are right about, though, is that there was a strategic reason for the French building air bases right behind the Western Front.

  31. Peter L. Griffiths

    We would all like to know what French bombers succeeded in bombing German territory between September 1939 and June 1940, and the airfields they came from.

  32. I don't know if you noticed this, but the framing of your argument has changed slightly. At one moment you were arguing that France did not have bombers (whether in 1934 or in 1939/40 isn't clear to me). Now, you are asking about successful bombing raids over Germany. (These qualifications would exclude reconnaissance flights over Germany, leaflet raids over Germany, and bombing attacks on German troops once on French or Belgian soil, and I would now have to be proving to you that the French dropped bombs on Germany in order to refute your thesis that the French were behind the Blitz.

    Fortunately, it's easy to do. (Ask Brett about the magic of the Google sometime.) Here: you'll appreciate this link's disdain for things French, too.

  33. Post author

    Peter, could you at least acknowledge that the questions you think need asking have in fact already been asked and answered by historians? Which you could discover for yourself with some research. And that they actually provide little in the way prima facie evidence for your position (whatever it is)?

  34. Peter L. Griffiths

    The absence of serious bombing of cities before June 1940 arose from an unwritten understanding between France and Germany that the war should be decided by their respective ground forces. Britain was not included in this agreement, particularly after the French capitulation. Unlike most modern historians, I was alive during the 1930s and 1940s.

  35. Ah the unwritten agreement. The one that serious historians have never been able to find...

    Peter while I respect people who lived through this most terrible era in human history you need to look through some books and come up with a cogent argument with some evidence as to what you are claiming. Each time you have made a claim you have been shown historical evidence to the contrary and instead of accepting this you have made another claim.

  36. And following Ross' point, several of the claims contain their own contradictions, not to mention being without evidence. The latter would make a great example of a logical fallacy.

    As to 'having been there' being some kind of trump card of superiority, no, just no. Were the points being made available to the average schoolboy's understanding, that's have some minor validity. Current international diplomatic relations and strategy were probably not included in the class or social curriculum.

    Incidentally, the first bombing raid on Berlin was by a French Navy Farman NC2234 (F-AIRN 'Jules Verne') in May 1940, a month after French bombing raids on Germany had commenced.

  37. Peter L. Griffiths

    Children in Japan, Australia, and New Zealand will be learning about natural disasters from their own personal experiences, not from listening to teachers or reading the theses of historians.

  38. Oh, those dumb old historians. They weren't children in disasters, what do they know?
    But wait. I was a child in a disaster once. Mudslides wrecked my hometown twice in two years.
    But that gives me exactly direct insight into what is happening right now in Japan that is not accessible to anyone else.
    In the same way, your living through WWII gives you no insight into the large swathes of the war that occurred outside your direct experience.

    All I can do with my experience is bring it to work. So I might choose to spin crazy theories about the role of dykes in history, but I do so within the framework of my historical method. That same historical method tells me that I can and should research the procurement and operational history of the French air force in WWII, rather than rely on recollections and urban myths.

    So far, results have justified my methods.

  39. Post author

    Peter, you 'were there'. You claim this gives you an insight into what happened. How do you propose to convince those of us who weren't there that what you say is true?

    (Let me also add that historians who were alive during the 1930s and 1940s don't seem to share your insights. What do you make of that?)

  40. Peter L. Griffiths

    The special experience I had in April 1941 was not to be bombed, but to be able to observe about 30 German bombers approaching Liverpool from Wales. The question which puzzled me for about 20 years later was why did the bombers approach Liverpool from Wales. Like everyone else including historians I assumed they had come from Germany. About 20 years later I read in an article (I think in the Liverpool Daily Post) that the bombers had come from Northern France, but even that left me with the impression that they had come from the Calais area. All was revealed to me when I was able to read the Luftwaffe Order of Battle August 1940 which I have mentioned above, but which has not been mentioned by your other correspondents. It was the bombers of London which mostly came from the Calais area, leaving the rest of Northern France to bomb the rest of Britain.

  41. Chris Williams

    Some of them came from Denmark and Norway too, you know. It's like the germans were flying from the countries which they had invaded which were closest to Britain. Weird.

  42. "All was revealed to me when I was able to read the Luftwaffe Order of Battle August 1940"

    So there was a gap in the knowledge gained from being there which had to be filled in by reading a document, which is what historians do.

    (What am I doing commenting here? Back to writing my book now.)

  43. Post author

    The question which puzzled me for about 20 years later was why did the bombers approach Liverpool from Wales. Like everyone else including historians I assumed they had come from Germany.

    I'm sorry, but this is simply wrong. Historians did not assume the bombers 'came from Germany' (not in the sense of operating from airfields in Germany; obviously they were built there!). No historian writing about the Battle of Britain and the Blitz has ever disputed this or been unaware of it -- mainly because it was perfectly well-known in 1940 that they came from France (and the Low Countries). I find it hard to believe that any journalists writing about events at the time could have failed to know this, but I suppose it's possible.

    There is an example right here on this blog, in the form of extracts from the Observer of 1 September 1940. If you click on that link you can see a map of Britain and nearby countries; the dotted line going across Belgium and northern France is Germany's 'line of advanced bases'. An accompanying article explains:

    Germany is now known to have moved a large part of her air force to advanced bases in occupied territory in order to reduce the range for her onslaught on Great Britain. The general run of these advance bases is shown by the heavy dotted line.

    Now, as a historian I'm concerned with how people then found out about aerial warfare and what they knew; so that you and others were not aware of this at the time is actually quite interesting. But I do suggest that you might want to reassess your attitudes to modern historians and the French people!

  44. Peter L. Griffiths

    Thank you for the informative article and map from the Observer of 1 September 1940. I was only aged 10 at the time so I was not into reading Observer articles, but I would agree that my elders may have missed something important. It should be borne in mind that the Germans were supposed to be our enemy not the French. It is a pity that there have so far been no obviously French contributions to this debate. On the internet there have been BBC accounts of the blitz on various British cities, not once is France mentioned as providing the airfields for the bombers (apart from my own interjections).

  45. Post author

    Peter, this is where you came in, with the implication that there is something sinister in the fact that German bombers operated from French airfields. If you are going to start repeating things which have been refuted here already, I don't see there is much point continuing this discussion.

    But let's try this one more time: France was invaded and beaten by Germany; France then surrendered; Germany then occupied northern France for the duration; Germany then attacked Britain from airfields in northern France. It was not a matter of France 'providing' airfields for Germany to use: as a thoroughly and partially-occupied defeated nation, France had no choice.

    And yes, the Germans were your enemy in 1940. They were the ones dropping the bombs, not the French. That was definitely in all the papers at the time.

  46. Peter L. Griffiths

    The bombers from France organised by the Luftwaffe during 1940-41 were more broadly targeted but in other respects were less dangerous than the V1 and V2 missiles coming from Holland to London from September 1944 to March 1945 organised by the SS. Fortunately the advancing Allied ground forces were able to prevent further damage. The Dutch Resistance seemed to be conspicuously more active in 1944-45 than the French Resistance had been in 1940-41.

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