Sealion 1918

I taught the origins of WWI in several courses over the years, and to the best of my knowledge, there is no evidence of any sort in the sources, nor is there any suggestion in the literature, to support Kramer's assertion.

This ground has been very well covered with every side publishing voluminous collections of diplomatic documents in the thirties, as well as in memoirs, diaries and other sources. There is no body of evidence to suggest that Germany seriously contemplated invading Britain nor is there evidence that Britain took any such threat seriously - which is what annoyed popular writers who felt it might be a danger. It certainly didn't weight on the minds of Grey and the cabinet in August 1914, which is the critical issue here.

That elements in Germany expected and sought a 'weltkreig' is certainly true, but they were more focussed on the emerging power of the US, not on Britain.

As for outbuilding Britain in dreadnoughts, well that was never practicable and it was never Tirpitz' aim - his plan was more subtle. He estimated the limits of the economic power that lay behind the size of the Royal Navy, and bearing in mind it's global commitments, worked out how many dreadnoughts Germany needed to achieve a balance of power which would force Britain to make concessions to Germany before she got into an arms race which she (Britain) could not afford in money or in manpower. The High Seas Fleet was never meant to actually go toe-to-toe with the Home Fleet, but rather to bring England to the brink of financial ruin. It is, of course, questionable if his successors or the Kaiser ever appreciated the fine details of Tirpitz thinking, but I suspect some people in the Reagan White House might have got the idea.

I'm willing to be corrected on this, but I'm pretty sure I am right and Kramer is very wrong.

Brock Milman has suggested that if you look at the deployment of the army at home during WW1, you have to conclude that many/most of them were there to guard against industrial unrest, not invasion.

As for Tirpitz, I'm under the impression that he wanted to build as many ships as possible, and the exact justification tended to shift over time. I'm not sure about the 'bleed 'em dry' theory (which I don't think that Reagan ever articulated either, come to that): if only because the Kaiserreich was engaged in an army race with the Entente. Starting up a naval race with Britain - otherwise a far more obvious ally for Germany - has to be one of the nineteenth-century's Top Ten Brain-Dead Strategic Decisions.

Good beard, though.

You’re absolutely right that Germany never planned to invade Britain

Well, there was *a* contingency plan to invade Britain (which I realize is not quite the same thing) in the early years of William II's reign: see Paul Kennedy's article The Development of German Naval Operations: Plans against England, 1896-1914, originally in the EHR. But Tirpitz was hostile to the idea and once the Dreadnought race began it was relegated to the archives permanently.

Isn't that just the sort of thing that naval officers just did unconsciously, like noting the sailing characteristics of a ship?

"There's the shoal water, and here are the leading marks on the hill. Once we anchor I'll go ashore to report to the Ambassador. Now, Charles, how would you enfilade that battery on the point?"

Whatever home service men were supposed to be for, they might not all have been very effective if they were called on to act. From what I know about the Royal Defence Corps it seems to have been composed of men who weren't fit for front line combat, but not quite bad enough to be discharged completely. Of course the two regular divisions in 1914 would have been a different matter but things probably went downhill as the war went on.

"At the time, British decision-makers could only sense intuitively what we know today — this was far more than a conservative defence of the status quo: had Germany succeeded at the Marne in September 1914, which it almost did, the defeat of France and a separate peace would have been followed by a defeat of Russia and, after a pause to build up the German navy, the invasion of Britain from a position of towering strength on the Continent."

At first, my response was like yours, to say, "You what?"

But on mulling it, I have to ask what Kramer actually means by an 'invasion of Britain,' or rather, what kind of invasion? Does he mean a permanent occupation? Or an invasion as knockout blow?

With respect to the latter, there were discussions by various sections of the Admiralty Staff in 1896/97 of a number of Anglo-German war scenarios. Vague plans (maybe 'plan' is too strong a word) were made concerning landings along the Thames estuary, the destruction of port facilities, the landing of troops, even the shelling of London from the Thames, all seemingly with a view to knocking Britain out of any conflict by forcing her to early peace terms. These were all predicated on the idea that a limited but swift defeat of part of the Royal Navy would allow the invasion force to nip up the Thames before the bulk of the British fleet could recover and rally.

However, when Schlieffen was consulted, his reply was that it was pointless to entertain limited peace terms. Schlieffen also recognised that the Germans could only ever hope to defeat part of the British navy. His point was that an invading German army would have to land before the bulk of the Royal Navy could respond and 'kneel on the chest of [its] prostrate enemy until he begs for mercy, for peace at any price', that price to be the handing over of the entire British navy which, otherwise, would forever be a threat.

Now, it seems to me that between the lines, Schlieffen was highlighting a Catch-22 situation: in order to neutralise the British navy, it is necessary to invade Britain; but in order to invade Britain, it is necessary to neutralise the British navy. I wonder if he said what he said partly to stop the Admiralty Staff headbangers' rash talk of invading Britain...

Back to Kramer... So perhaps he meant that a victorious Germany would ultimately invade Britain. Well, that's always a fear, isn't it? But it's not the same as it being a foregone conclusion. And a Germanised Europe, with a crippled France eternally blazing with resentment at perfidious Albion's desertion of her in her hour of need, was a sobering enough prospect for a British cabinet in 1914 without invoking unspecified future invasions.

Personally, I think Kramer's comment is a rhetorical flourish, a throwaway remark not to be taken seriously. Just because it's written in a book doesn't make it true...

For the British Army in 1914 I would suggest you read Charles Messenger's Call To Arms: The British Army 1914-18 and Trevor Holmes' Tommy: The British Soldier On The Western Front. The former in particular is very precise on what the role of the "Terriers" (and certain second line formations) on outbreak of war (guarding of vital points) and their roles being taken over by the third line units. It was a combination of anti-invasion and anti-saboteur work - the latter covered industrial sabotage by Irish and other disgruntled elements.

Thanks for the pointer - had not heard of the book.

Wilson's slant is interesting - it would apply to Messenger's work for instance, as he concerned with the raising and training of the British Army and the battles are but mentioned only in their effect on that task.

I must have words with Professor Wilson when next I meet him - he lives in the same city as me (he moved here on his retirement) and I have run into him at various meetings. His collaborator Robin Prior is also here.