Battle of Britain and the Battle of Britain

Since I shamefully forgot to blog Battle of Britain Day last year, I made sure not to repeat this mistake this year. I'm marking the occasion by re-watching the classic 1969 film Battle of Britain, directed by Guy Hamilton. I must confess that I love this film. It's not just because of the fantastic aerial action sequences, featuring several dozen real Spitfires, Hurricanes, Me 109s and He 111s.1 Well, it's mainly because of that (and the music, oh yes, the music -- Ron Goodwin's stirring and bombastic theme as well as the William Walton piece in the dreamlike "duel in the sky" sequence [edit: actually called "Battle in the air"]) but it's also because it manages to encapsulate just about every theme, anecdote, stereotype and myth about the Battle going. 'Call me Meyer'? Check. The Big Wing debate? Check. 'Yellow-nosed bastards'? Check. WAAFs and their plotting tables? Check. Home Guards armed with pitch-forks? Check. Galland asking Goering for a squadron of Spitfires? Check. Over-enthusiastic and unintelligible Poles engaging the enemy against orders? Check. Civilians huddled in Tube stations? Check. 'Achtung! Spitfire!' Check. Fresh-faced young pilots rushed into action and to their deaths after only a few hours' training? Check. I could go on and on, and in fact I will! The invasion barges assembling in France? Check. The close escort order? Check. The importance of radar? Check. The turn on London? Check. RAF fighter pilots unbuttoning their top button? Check. OK, I'll stop now! But my point is that Battle of Britain is your one-stop shop for reaffirming the myth of 1940, and is, to me, all the more enjoyable for it. And as such, the film is probably partly responsible for the heated reaction last month to the claim that it was the Royal Navy which 'saved' Britain in 1940, not the RAF (Blog Them Out of the Stone Age had a good post on the matter).

I don't see why it has to be an either/or situation. The RAF was the first line of defence, the Navy was the second (and the Army, the third). Massively inferior as they were at sea, the Germans had absolutely no chance whatsoever, unless they had air superiority. Even then, of course, it would have been decidedly dicey and perhaps impossible. However, it never came to that, because the RAF did their job (and not just Fighter Command, but Bomber Command and Coastal Command too, in attacking the invasion ports and airfields, at great cost). But the Navy's strength was essential to Britain's victory. It was why Germany was forced to fight Britain in the air in the first place -- without the Navy, maybe Germany could have chanced an invasion against the battered Army.

Rather than the inter-service rivalry question, I think that the persistence of the myth of 'The Few' is more interesting, and more telling. In Battle of Britain, Dowding (Laurence Olivier) says something to the effect that his men needed a 4:1 kill ratio just to keep even, ie to shoot down four German aircraft for every British one lost. (Actually, he elides aircraft and aircrew, but it's clear the former was meant.) But as Stephen Bungay argues in The Most Dangerous Enemy: A History of the Battle of Britain (London: Aurum Press, 2000), once production, reserves, and training are taken into account, it was the other way around. The Luftwaffe had sustained heavy losses in the spring of 1940, which was very bad seeing as it had been built to maximise front-line strength, to the neglect of reserves. And despite having an apparently huge superiority in numbers, the key comparison was in numbers of fighters, and single-seat fighters at that, where the Luftwaffe only had a slight edge. Every German aircraft shot down over Britain meant a permanent loss of aircrew (with the exception of one who got away), whereas British pilots who were shot down were often soon back at their squadrons. In addition, despite all the predictions in the pre-war literature about the Germans carefully drawing their plans about when and where to strike Britain for maximum damage, the Luftwaffe's target plan was abysmal. Intelligence was either poor or ignored, key targets were neglected in favour of unimportant ones, and the nature of Dowding's command and control organisation was not understood, despite its descent (with modifications) from the system which they'd come up against in the First World War. The question is less, could Germany have won the Battle of Britain? and more, could Britain have lost it? And furthermore, why has this been forgotten? Why not take pride in Fighter Command's thorough and professional preparation for the defence of Britain, rather treating it as an heroic fight against the odds? My pat answer is that it's probably because the former smacks of German militarism, while the latter suits the English amateur sporting ideal. But I'm sure there are other possible explanations.

PS I forgot to include some links about the film. There are disappointingly few. The usual: Wikipedia and IMDB. A couple of pages about the filming, here and here (that one shows that model Me 110s were constructed for the film, but they don't appear in the film, as far as I know). Finally, one has to wonder if Susannah York's character had time-traveled to 1940 from 1969, judging by her hairstyle ...

PPS I also forgot to mention this claim that it wasn't the RAF who won the Battle of Britain, or even the RN, but the Dutch! You may ask how that is possible, since they were only in the war for 5 days. The answer to this is that the Dutch destroyed many aircraft which were supposedly due to be used for an airborne landing in Britain later that month. Yes, apparently Germany was so confident of knocking off France that they were planning to simultaneously launch the biggest overseas invasion in history. As can be seen, I wasn't persuaded, but perhaps I am too unimaginative.

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  1. Supposedly, together they composed the 35th largest air force at the time. If so, then since it was flying unarmed piston engined aircraft, it was an air force that even New Zealand could have beaten. []

55 thoughts on “Battle of Britain and the Battle of Britain

  1. Are you aware of this book? Very detailed coverage. Reading between the lines of the chapter on the models, I think that they built a Stuka, Bf 110 and Hurricane as the initial models. However, they seem then to have abandoned the 110 once it became apparent that they would have full-size Bf 109s and He 111s available, and so needed to devote their time to making models of those.

  2. Post author

    Alan:

    Yes, that's another cliche the filmmakers dutifully included -- and we still haven't exhausted them all!

    Tony:

    No, I haven't come across that book before. I was thinking too that having 110s in the film would complicate the story-telling. Most people would just think it's a bomber, so you'd need scenes explaining that it's actually a fighter, and what it was supposed to do, and then scenes showing them getting ripped to pieces and so on. It would just add to the length and cost of the film, while probably detracting from the plot (there's already a scene where Stukas get massacred, so a similar scene with 110s would undercut the sense of the RAF being underdogs). Having said that, it would have been cool to see them ...

  3. Adolf Galland

    Yep, BoB's one of my favourite guilty pleasures, and I totally agree with your observations about the dishy Susannah York and transportation from Carnaby Street.

    Favourite dialogue:

    "Dag-a-dag-a-dag-a-dag-a-dag-a-dag-a-dag-a"

    And you really can't go past Edward Fox for a touch of the old stiff upper lip.

    And what did happen to all those delightfully flying condition warbirds?

  4. Post author

    'Spring chicken to shitehawk in one easy lesson' -- it's the line Edward Fox was born to say!

    Thanks for the video, Adolf (if that is your real name). Now that's what fighters should sound like! I wonder it's from, though? As the comments point out, there aren't any flightworthy Mosquitos any more. It doesn't really look like CG to me -- it's bloody good if it is though. The uniform camouflage and squadron markings seem to suggest it's for a movie, rather than an airshow ... 633 Squadron? Years since I've seen it, can't remember. As far as I can tell, the aircraft in 633 Squadron had different markings anyway.

  5. Christine Keeler

    OK, Brett so you cleverly sussed out it was a nom de plume.

    Yeah I agree about the clip. I had another look and, not sure if I'm imagining things, but the film stock seems to have a very definite 60s quality about it. But who cares, it's all good.

    Here's a couple of contemporary faves, one featuring a spit, and another three tornados. Both gems:

    http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4RHL3o7ctZU&mode=related&search=

    http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7IwplA7_4lU

  6. Nabakov

    Susannah York in black stockings. Cheeeeck.

    Yes, I just watched BoB again recently and it's still a wonderful slice of boy's own mythos.

    And czeck out Dark Blue World if you haven't already. The best Czech movie ever made about a love triangle between young pilots during the Battle of Britain. The flying sequences are ace.

  7. Some of the larger aerial battles come by way of BoB cuttings, but DBW does include original combat sequences; at the time of its release it was the most expensive Czech film ever made, for whatever that's worth. Be warned, however; if you think BoB is stacked with hoary cinematic cliches, just wait till you see the dog in DBW ...

  8. Post author

    Be warned, however; if you think BoB is stacked with hoary cinematic cliches, just wait till you see the dog in DBW …

    Excellent! Looks like a viewing of both 633 Squadron and Dark Blue World is in my near future.

  9. Christine Keeler

    Oh dear. All this talk makes me want to have some Dambusters and Reach for the Sky moments.

    Speaking of which I re-read RFTS a few years ago, and it's little wonder DB lost his legs. The man was a bloody maniac who smashed just about anything he got into. Cars, bikes, planes. It didn't matter.

  10. The Battle of Britain is both a classic and a favourite. Thanks for the reminder Brett. I remember my Dad taking me along to see when I was a child. He recounted how his Aunt had taken him into London on 7 Sep 1940 as it was his birthday. He recalled the aerial battle overhead that day and living through the Blitz. Growing up near Biggin Hill made it all the more relevant to me.

    Dark Blue World is also highly recommended. It hads some beautiful aerial cinematography and holds up to repeated viewing. What Susannah York was to BoB, Tara Fitzgerald is to DBW!

  11. Post author

    Thanks, Rob. That would certainly have been a memorable birthday!

    We'll have to see about Tara Fitzgerald -- you're building her up quite a bit there :)

  12. Where the planes are now:

    Rudhall's book has a chapter listing the location of the surving aircraft as of 2000, as far as could be traced. Most of the aircraft actually owned by Spitfire Productions, the Spitfires, Hurricanes and Buchons (109s) survive, though a few have been written off over the years. The Heinkels, which were owned by the Spanish Air Force, have survived less well, with more than half being scrapped in the early 1970s.

    Surprisingly, a number of the wooden replicas of Spits and Hurris, built as set dressing, also survive.

    One thing often overlooked about BoB is the boost it gave to the 'warbird' movement. A lot of Spits were made airworthy for the film (including what is now the BBMF's Spitfire II), had if not been for the film it is doiubtful any of the Spanish Airforce's 109s and 111s would be still in existence, and, Rudhall argues, a lot of people got interested in the whole notion of preserving WWII aircraft in flying condition. Without this film, airshows ever since might have been very different.

  13. That Mossie footage ...

    ... is truly grand. But where is it from?

    It's definitely not CGI. CGI doesn't look like that. That's real, that is.

    I agree that the stock looks to be from the 1960s, probably late '60s. It can't be much later than that, as I doubt there would be four airworthy Mossies after that.

    The thought that it's from a movie is boosted by the squadron codes, which are fake. 'JE' was, as far as I know, never carried by any squadron, being the personal codes of JE 'Johnnie' Johnson. 'HE' was 263 Squadron's Codes, but they flew single-seat fighters (Hurricanes, Whirlwinds and Typhoons).

    It's not 633 Squadron, for three reasons: (1) there are no Spitfires in 633 Squadron; (2) 633 Squadron uses 'HT' codes'; (3) the glazed noses were painted over and fitted with fake cannon to look like the solid nose on the fighter-bomber variant. I don't think it's Mosquito Squadron either - again, I don't think there are Spits in that film, and as much of the aerial footage is reused from 633 Squadron, you would expect the aircraft to be similarly painted up (though Mosquite Squadron is such a piece of hack-work one can't be sure). However, given the low number of airworthy Mossies even by the 1960s, it's probably the same Mosquitos that were in 633 Squadron.

    But beyond that I don't know.

  14. Christine Keeler

    Well there's a thesis topic if ever there was one, Tony, and much opportunity for sucking up to wealthy warbird owners for free rides purely in the interests of academic research.

    Bad luck about the accident Selfridge, but it really was a wizard prang. You seem to have recovered remarkably well.

    Tally ho!

  15. Post author

    Well, blow me down with a feather -- it IS actually CG! It's made by somebody in Japan called Tochy. The other work on his site is good, though you can (just) tell they are CG, and the physics sometimes doesn't look quite right. But the Merlins movie is just sensational.

  16. Christine Keeler

    I'm so totally impressed that you tracked that down and I would never have believed it was CGI.

    I love the metallic CG dialogue on some of the other stuff, too.

  17. Post author

    I still find it hard to believe it's CG. On a forum somewhere I did see one minor criticism, that the propellors all seem to be aligned -- on the same aircraft and between aircraft too. If you pause the video you can see this is the case. Pretty minor stuff and easy enough to fix for the next iteration.

  18. Steven Holman

    Pretty impressive.

    But there are some problems in it like the propellors like you mentioned. There's also the shadows are sometimes a bit too 'hard' and the lighting seems to be too bright and unfocused it some spots.

    Although I wouldnt of noticed these if I wasnt told that they were CG beforehand

  19. Post author

    Thanks, Steven! (For everyone else, Steven is my youngest brother, and is an avid CG modeller himself, so his comments carry some weight.)

  20. Brett;
    'The question is less, could Germany have won the Battle of Britain? and more, could Britain have lost it? And furthermore, why has this been forgotten? Why not take pride in Fighter Command's thorough and professional preparation for the defence of Britain, rather treating it as an heroic fight against the odds? My pat answer is that it's probably because the former smacks of German militarism, while the latter suits the English amateur sporting ideal. But I'm sure there are other possible explanations.'

    I 've had a hoot reading this blog and love the links to You Tube etc. The BoB film was a product of it's time, and many of the clichés are a reflection of modern perception, rather than how things were.
    However, on a more serious point, I simply can't allow the above extract from Brett to go unchallenged....................
    The fact is, that The Luftwaffe was able to attack at a time and place of it's choosing, day or night, and Fighter Command were obliged to respond. Even with the advantage of Radar, this meant that most engagements were usually numerically one-sided. Statistics can be made twisted to mean anything, but the RAF fighters were obliged to take on all the German a/c, fighters and bombers, indeed, they were ordered to concentrate on the German bombers. Yes, there were some reserves of machines, but in a battle, what is immediately available is what counts. Production at the time however, was very very slow.
    It was almost impossible, and certainly impractical, to get a similar-sized or larger force to the attackers in a location at a given time. There is no 'myth' to this story - it's all well documented fact. Park was in the front line and had to respond with limited resources. Mallory's tactics were rather too unwieldy given the limited resources at the time.
    When the roles were similar but reversed over the Reich, the Germans were unable to defend their resources - and lost the war as a direct result.
    As for the Navy, - yes, they were far superior to the Kreigsmarine, certainly in terms of surface vessels. However, as was proven by the Japanese, RN capital ships could be, and were sunk in a few minutes by a/c. Evidence the Repulse and Prince of Wales's rapid demise in the Far East and the Jap losses in the marrianas. Without command of the air, the RN ships would have been slaughtered, their anti-aircraft defences at the time being relatively poor. Look at Pearl Harbor, - and that was much later...
    True, - the German force was cobbled together and one may even debate whether Hitler was, originally wholly serious about the whole enterprise. What is not in any doubt, is that, - had Fighter Command failed, the Luftwaffe would have had a field-day with the RN and Britain would have been wide open to invasion. There can be NO serious doubts that Hitler, thus emboldened, would have passed-by another easy victory and secured his Western flank.
    Lets stop being silly 'old chap'.. Of course it was a heroic fight against the odds, (The battle scored highly on all three counts!) not in any way inconsistent with the RAF's meticulous pre-war preparations. 'Sporting ideal..'.. now who's succumbing to clichés...???

    PS; - Incidentally, Mers-el-Kebir mentioned on the BBC OU site article is far from forgotten (Unless by the plebs who such films as the BoB have to be kept simple for), but of little relevance. It wasn't a battle, just an execution of policy. There was no way those ships were going to be allowed out of harbour intact unless they were with the RN.

  21. Post author

    That's a fair cop; I did say it was a pat answer!

    But I don't think you can dismiss statistics so cavalierly. Fighter Command was outnumbered, but not hugely so, unless you compare apples and oranges. In July 1940 it had about 700 Hurricanes and Spitfires. The three opposing Luftflotten had about 2600 aircraft. Sounds impressive, yeah? But only 800 of those were Me 109s. The rest were basically victims, as Bungay points out, including the Me 110. A superiority of 8:7 is not exactly overwhelming. Also, during the Battle British fighter production was roughly double that of Germany's. British reserves were more than double the Luftwaffe's at the start of the war anyway, and the Luftwaffe lost many more aircraft from Poland through France than did Britain (something like 2800 to 1100+). Oh yes: there's the problem of aircrew, too, but it's often forgotten that the Germans had to find a lot more replacements than did the British, because so many more of their losses were 5-man bombers and 2-man fighters. On these numbers, Fighter Command was not greatly outnumbered, and it was much better placed to fight a long campaign than was the Luftwaffe.

    As for the difficulty of the attacker being able to choose the time and place, usually being attacked in much smaller numbers of RAF fighters, etc, these weren't such a problem as one might think, given the nature of dogfighting. Many anecdotal accounts suggest that small numbers of RAF planes would often charge in and do serious harm to an enemy formation, particularly if they had the height and the Sun; even if they didn't shoot down many aircraft, the action would break up and confuse the bomber crews, softening them up for the next penny-packet of fighters that came along, and disrupting their ability to find and bomb their target. In fighter vs. fighter, the bigger battles generally saw fewer relative casualties: with 30 or 40 fighters (even if it was 30 Germans and 10 Brits) wheeling around each other, it was much harder to concentrate on one target to destruction -- a very different situation to 3 Germans on 1 Brit, say.

    Finally, on the vulnerability of warships to aircraft: this is basically ONLY true if the aircraft were armed with armour piercing bombs or torpedoes. Perhaps someone can correct me, but my understanding is that Germany did not have much in the way of naval air, nor much training or doctrine for such. Japan off Malaya and the US in the Marianas (and Britain at Taranto) had all of these things.

    Still, I agree absolutely that Germany needed air superiority if it was to have any chance. I just think that the likelihood of (a) them achieving that air superiority and (b) using it to successfully invade Britain have been greatly exagerrated. Now, this in no way detracts from the bravery of Fighter Command pilots, etc, who no doubt did feel they were up against it and did see their friends dying and still went on flying, or the skill of Park, who directed his forces in a masterly fashion. But it seems to me that the idea that Britain was the underdog does prevent the acknowledgement of the professionalism of RAF and Air Ministry personnel who created the best air defence system in the world at that time.

  22. Post author

    It also occurred to me that the whole "overwhelming odds" thing may well be a relic of the pre-war knock-out blow/bomber will always get through mentality.

  23. Pontius

    There was during the war, and has been since, plenty of hype and jingoism about the BoB etc. I must confess, at I too, at one stage started to come round to the idea that it was all blown-up out of all proportion and there was realy no way that the Germans would have actually invaded. I have since re-revised my views. The more I have found out, the more I have realised that it really was as much of a seminal moment as it was always made out to be. There are many reasons for this. Firstly the whole question of 'odds' revolves around what they really were at the time and place. In most cases, by force of circumstance, for any given engagement, the RAF fighters were in a clear minority, fighter to fighter, even ignoring the bombers, as well as usually at a tactical disadvantage. One small point relates to the Me110. This machine is widely and unfairly denigrated. True, in a fighter to fighter turning situation it would tend to lose out. However, try telling the many RAF pilots who were shot down by them... It was a fast heavily armed a/c. Given their experience, superior tactics and height/upsun position, their heavier armament could do much more damage than a 109...and often did, so one can't simply write the Me110 out of the battle. Bungay is pretty cavalier himself to dismiss them out of hand.

    Another issue is that about 3/4 of the RAF fighters were Hurricanes. Fine for knocking - out bombers, but not a patch on the 109, especially at the higher altitudes. Yet another point is armament. The eight .303's were reliable and had a high rate of fire, but the Germans use of heavier calibre and cannons was decisive. Machines could be, and often were, perforated by many .303 bullets and got home. Although the 109's cannon had a very low muzzle-rate, it was non the less highly effective and only one or two hits could disable an a/c or kill or maim the pilot. More than two hits was usually terminal. The Spitfires experimental cannons during the BoB were useless.

    Much of the time, the RAF controllers struggled to get the RAF fighters into a good attacking position too. True, later they got better at it, but for most of the battle, the attacks would veer all over to confuse the defenders as to the true target. This regularly resulted in the RAF a/c attacking on the climb or even into sun too. This, and the small numbers of RAF machines in any one attack put the Jerries at a big advantage at the actual time and place. The 'Odds' in the BoB are NOT simply a question of machine-counts which is very misleading; - it's the actual odds for the engagements.

    Ships; The Luftwaffe had no difficulty whatever sinking shipping in the Channel, at Dunkirk, on the Russian convoys and in the Mediterranean. They had an ideal tool in the dive-bomber (Ju88's as well as Ju87's) and throughout the war they had better explosives. For any given size and weight, the Germans bombs were generally much more effective. It's also worth bearing in mind that many of our ships defending would have been smaller and older vessels with little or no protection from bombs. With German air-superiority over the Channel it would have been a Turkey shoot. Incidentally, by the end of the war the Germans were using wire-guided and TV-guided air-launched anti-shipping missiles and glider-bombs....

    Had the Germans managed to subdue the RAF, or even push 10 Group back to a defensive line behind to the north and west of London, they might easily have managed a small toe-hold, say based on places such as Manston and Shoreham by an airborne assault. With fighters based in the UK and fuel-endurance less of an issue, things could have gotten out of hand very quickly indeed. Crete is a good example here. A high initial cost to the German airborne troops, but once they had an airstrip it became a rout - and we lost a lot of ships too.... Given the state of our Army at the time - we would have been in a real pickle. Most of the home Guard paraded with broom handles or wooden cut-out of rifles...!

  24. I've been thinking about the Battle of Britain on and off for thirty-five years plus, and again in light of the recent claims that 'it woz the RN wot won it.' As ever, this sort of thing gets overblown in the hands of the press. My own view is that clearly the principal threat to a successful German invasion of the UK was not the Royal Air Force, but the Royal Navy, and in particular its destroyers. That's not particularly a new idea.

    And it doesn't make the Battle of Britain irrelevant - far from it. The Kriegsmarine was not remotely strong enough to take on the Royal Navy and eliminate its destroyer fleet. That meant that the job had to be passed to the Luftwaffe. Which means that the Royal Air Force had to be eliminated before the Royal Navy could be dealt with. By preventing the elimination of Fighter Command, the RAF did indeed stop plans for an invasion proceeding.

    What, I think, confuses this picture is the notion that defeat of the RAF would immediately have been followed by the invasion. Had, for example, the next event after Fighter Command's withdrawal from the skies over Kent been a German assault in September 1940, then, as naval planners have pointed out, it is very likely that some destroyers would have got amongst the barges and created havoc. The Navy would have suffered serious losses in such an assault, but those to the Germans would have been greater. (Remember that, despite serious losses at Dunkirk and Crete, the RN still achieved its principal objectives, the evacuation of British troops.)

    But defeat of the RAF would have opened the way for a serious aerial campaign against the Royal Navy and its ports, which might eventually have eliminated the threat to German invasion. But even had everything gone right for the Germans, it seems doubtful that a serious invasion could have been launched before 1941.

    Which begs the question - why did the Germans spend so much time and effort making preparations for an invasion in 1940, such as moving the barges into the invasion areas (thus making them vulnerable to RAF attack)? I think the reasons are psychological. On the one hand, it gave the Wehrmacht, on a high after sweeping across France, something to do, and kept their morale up - a sense that their rolling victories were continuing. On the other, apparent imminence of invasion might, especially if combined with a Luftwaffe victory, increase the pressure on the British government to come to terms, which was, after all, Hitler's preferred solution.

    What happened in Crete I don't think is a good analogy. The seizure of Maleme airfield allowed the Germans to bring equipment and reinforcements into Crete faster than the British could. It's hard to see how seizure of a couple of airfields in Kent and Sussex would have created the same situation in southern England. Nor was the British army a negligible problem for the Germans. Though it was in no state to resist invasion in June 1940, by August reorganization and reequipment had changed the strategic situation significantly.

  25. Chris Williams

    "Ships; The Luftwaffe had no difficulty whatever sinking shipping in the Channel, at Dunkirk, on the Russian convoys and in the Mediterranean. "

    Trouble is that Sperrle's got to sink _everything_. Even one destroyer's going to sink a big chunk of the invasion fleet.

    Look at the problems the Luftwaffe had sinking RN ships stuck in fjords in Norway. Look at the proportion of RN destroyers at Dunkirk (largely without air cover) that got away. Off Dunkirk, the Luftwaffe sunk many destroyers, and damaged many more, but it was unable to stop the RN carrying out Operation Dynamo, which was complex and required a lot of ships to come in close to land and load up whilst stationary. Cruising up and down the eastern Channel at 32 knots, pumping 4" shells into river barges with a foot of freeboard is a lot harder to disrupt.

    I don't think that the experience of the Med in 1941 is comparable. By then, the Luftwaffe had trained a specialist unit. Even they, they sank a lot of stuff, but didn't sink everything: the RN was able to evacuate Crete.

    Remember that this is a discussion about the BoB's strategic significance: it's got no bearing on the bravery or competence of the people who fought it. The BoB's great significance derives from the fact that it was the first time the Germans tried to do something and failed. They attacked at a time and place of their own choosing, and lost. They didn't come again in daylight. That's highly important, but it's not the factor that saved Britain from invasion in 1940.

  26. Perhaps the point about airpower v. seapower in WWII is that it worked most to the former's advantage when there were one or two critical ships to hit - one thinks for example of HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Repulse off Malaya, or for that matter the carrier battles of the Pacific. When the Navy had all of its eggs in one basket, a single well-placed bomb could make all the difference - whereas, as Dunkirk and Crete indeed showed, it was much harder to stop a multitude of small, fast vessels.

  27. Pontius

    I think getting involved in an in-depth discussion about destroyers is losing focus an the fact that the Germans were trying to gain control of the air over the southern counties, - and conspicuously failed to do so, but perhaps only for a lack of drop-tanks. We can discuss about ships all we like, but the bottom-line is that the Germans didn't gain even air-superiority, let alone air supremacy. That was an absolute prerequisite for invasion, full-stop. Strategically, it was a complete spanner in the works for the Germans. It happened, and the subsequent invasion battle did not. The outcome of the hypothetical combat between ships in the channel is pure speculation. Had the Germans won the BoB, - who knows, perhaps we WOULD have sued for peace. Some highly prominent figures in the Government wanted to.

    There is nothing new about the fact that Hitler was hoping to intimidate Britain into sueing for peace either. However, to construe from that, that, having gained control of the air, that they wouldn't have capitalised on that is very naive, - they were a ruthless and opportunistic enemy. They had plans, had allocated resources and had a timetable. Most of the RN's capital ships were kept out of the reach of the Luftwaffe and were far too far away to get to the Channel quickly. There is no doubt that the RN's destroyers would have gone out and fought themselves to a standstill, but the Germans, whilst lacking the RN's larger numbers of large surface ships, still had a good U-boat force and a fleet of especially effective E-Boats. These could wreak havoc, and did, for instance carving-up an Allied amphibious force heading for a practice landing just off the coast of Devonshire near Start Point. Also, ships sheltered in fjords are one thing, 1914-18 vintage destroyers out in the open in the Channel is quite another matter. Don't forget too, that a little later, admittedly with the help of bad weather, the Luftwaffe provided a very highly-effective air-cover screen for the Kreigsmarine's 'Channel-Dash'. Destroyers were not at all hardened targets and were not that much more difficult to sink than a merchant steamer.

    Citing the fact that shipping got away from Dunkirk doesn't really wash, as the Germans were pulling their punches. However, there was air-cover - it deliberately just wasn't close-in, - without that, it's certain that many, many more ships would have been sunk. The RAF didn't want it's a/c being shot down by the RN, who were notoriously trigger-happy, and rightly so.). Being bombed by those German a/c that got through created the impression to many that the RAF weren't really there, which is a minor myth in itself. Hitler could have turned Dunkirk into a bloodbath, but as we know, he was still in hope of a settlement. Indeed this idea persisted with him for some time. (We'll probably never know if Hess was really 'going it alone...') My point about Crete was not so much the ships, but that the Germans took it at all, against the odds, and very stiff dug-in opposition BY AIR. Had the Germans done a similar thing in Kent - who knows...even better fighter-cover available for the Kreigsmarine and local defence etc. I'm playing the Devils Advocate with this one, - but it ain't THAT far fetched looking at Crete. Manston was probably just about visible from the Cap Griz Nez. With control of the air, they could have taken it and possibly held it long enough to support any landings.

    CW; 'They didn't come again in daylight. That's highly important, but it's not the factor that saved Britain from invasion in 1940.' I'm sorry to have to disagree so bluntly on this, but this is just plain wrong. It might make good programming for the BBC and the 'de-bunking' industry, but it ignores the fact that the BoB is where the Blitzkrieg ran aground. Hitler sensed that a much bigger effort would be required and so (Fatally) turned his attentions elsewhere. If that's not 'about the BoB's strategic significance', then what on earth is..???

  28. Citing the fact that shipping got away from Dunkirk doesn't really wash, as the Germans were pulling their punches.

    That itself is a minor myth of the war, IMHO.

  29. I don't for a moment want to suggest that the Battle of Britain wasn't strategically significant. It was indeed the first point at which the German war machine was stopped, which was tremendously significant for British morale (and promoting the interventionist cause in the United States). Air superiority over south-east England was indeed a prerequisite for a successful invasion, and preventing the Luftwaffe achieving this did indeed stop invasion plans proceeding. I don't hold with the notion that the existence of the Royal Navy alone protected Britain from invasion, and that what happened in the skies was irrelevant.

    But equally I feel the notion that Fighter Command alone protected Britain from invasion, and had it failed, the occupation of the UK would have been a walk-over, is simplistic (not least because it neglects the effort and sacrifice of the Bomber Command aircrews who went after the invasion barges). The argument that the Royal Navy might still have been able to turn a September 1940 invasion into a disaster for the Germans cannot be easily dismissed, and there's plenty of evidence that senior figures in the OKW considered this a significant possibility. An invasion in Spring 1941, on the other hand, might have been a different issue.

    Of course, Hitler might still have forced an invasion in September 1940, but it seems to me that it would have been over the objections of his commanders. No doubt the Wehrmacht would have gone, but it's too glib to assume that such an invasion would have been successful.

    Fortunately, Fighter Command caused the invasion plans to fall at the first hurdle, rather than the second or third.

  30. Pontius

    Citing the fact that shipping got away from Dunkirk doesn’t really wash, as the Germans were pulling their punches.

    'That itself is a minor myth of the war, IMHO.'

    So the German forces that had just rammed the British ( & French) forces back in total disarray to the coast at breakneck speed, then sat there and 'let' them disembark because.................... Why? It's not like they didn't know what was going on...they had the resources at hand to cause complete carnage, but they took a break (Like they did after Dunkirk) - relatively speaking. It only makes any sense if Hitler still wanted to be a bit pawky and keep his options open. I seem to recall reading somewhere that a lot of the German Generals were pretty brassed-off at 'letting Britain off the hook'. Is there an authoratative source on this one..?

  31. Lutton's Dunkirk: The Patriotic Myth summarizes the story quite well. There's a good summary-of-the-summary here:

    After the war some German officers claimed that they were "shocked" when they received the order to stop their tanks at the river Aa, which permitted the French to establish a defensive line on the west side of Dunkirk. At the time, however, Panzer General Heinz Guderian visited his leading units on the approaches to Dunkirk and concluded that General Von Rundstedt had been right to order a halt and that further tank attacks across the wet land (which had been reclaimed from the sea) would have involved a useless sacrifice of some of his best troops. In his post-war memoirs and discussions with Sir Basil Liddell Hart, Guderian tried to blame Hitler for the suspension of the advance. From his discussions with Guderian and other German generals, Liddell Hart concluded that Hitler permitted the British Army to escape on purpose, hoping that this generous act would facilitate the conclusion of peace with Britain.[3]

    A number of years ago it became clear that the order to stop the advance of the German Panzer units had been expected for some time. General Von Rundstedt finally issued that order on 24 May which Hitler simply confirmed.[4] The troops were allowed to rest and local repairs were carried out on the armored vehicles. When the offensive resumed on 26 May the German priorities had shifted and the focus of the attack was Paris and the heartland of the country where a large body of French troops remained. Dunkirk was regarded as a sideshow. German Air Force units were assigned to bombard Dunkirk, but the weather there was generally unsuitable for flying and during the nine days of the evacuation the Luftwaffe interfered with it only two-and-a-half days-27 May the afternoon of 29 May and on 1 June.[5]

    NOTES:

    [3] This thesis first appeared in B.H. Liddell Hart's 1948 book, The German Generals Talk (British title: The Other Side of the Hill). The volume has recently been reprinted in paperback by William Morrow & Co. Years later he modified his views on this matter, remarking that Hitler's "decision was woven of several threads." He said that General Blumentritt, Rundstedt's ex-Chief-of-Staff, had told him that "the 'halt' had been called for more than military reasons, and that it was part of a political scheme to make peace easier to reach. If the BEF had been captured at Dunkirk, the British might have felt that their honor had suffered a stain which they must wipe out. By letting it escape Hitler hoped to conciliate them." B.H. Liddell Hart, History of the Second World War (G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1970) pp74-5, 77, 80-3.

    [4] Maj. Gen. J.F.C. Fuller, in his concise and perceptive review of the military questions involved, pointed out that Rundstedt first ordered Hoth's and Kleist's Panzer Groups to temporarily halt on the evening of 23 May. "In the circumstances this was a sound decision. The German armored divisions needed rest and an overhaul... The truth is, that the whole area was one vast tank obstacle, and that Hitler, who had a better understanding of the capability of tanks than most of his generals, considered their use in the Dunkirk area would be an 'incredible blun der'... The evacuation was a phenomenal success, as so many British retreats have been... The causes of the success were outside German control." Fuller, A Military History of the Western World, Vol. III: From the Seven Days Battle, 1862, to the Battle of Leyte Gulf, 1944 (Minerva Press, 1967) pp. 400-404. Another British observer, Alistair Horne, has written: "Three myths can be usefully dispatched... Thirdly, the fault for the 'Halt Order' cannot be placed solely at Hitler's door. Since the war, German generaldom has been committed for various reasons, which include both selfpreservation and professional pride, to blaming every war-time error and crime upon Hitler... But if anyone was primarily to blame, both on the evidence of the episode itself and of his past performance during the campaign, it was Rundstedt... He was an outstanding battle commander, but as a strategist he showed himself throughout to be almost as preconditioned by the experiences of the First World War as his French counterparts. On 24 May, it was the shock of what the British had done (in their brief offensive at Arras on 21 May) coupled with his ineradicable fears of what the French still could do, which principally decided Rundstedt, and, through him persuaded Hitler, to halt the Panzers." Horne, To Lose A Battle: France 1940 (pb. ad. pp. 602-03. Penguin Books, 1979, $5.95, ISBN: 0-14-00-50426).

    [5] Cajus Bakker, The Luftwaffe War Diaries, pb. ad. pp. 62-175. Translated by Frank Ziegler (Ballantine Books, 1980, $3.95. ISBN: 0-34528799-1). This book was first published in Germany in 1964. Though far from definitive, it remains the best history available of the German air force in World War II.

    Ockham's Razor suggests that the 'pulling your punches' thesis tries to explain something for which there's already a more-than-adequate explanation.

  32. Incidentally, before anyone jumps to any dodgy conclusions, I have no time whatsoever for the politics of the IHR. It's just that on this largely technical matter their review happens to be correct, IMHO.

  33. I would point out that the airborne assault on Crete was qualitatively and quantitatively different. To take Crete was to take the airfields and Suda Bay. There literally were no other objectives - without them, the allied garrison was shagged. The Allied position had neither depth nor effective lateral communication, nor were there any reserves, fortifications, artillery, fighters, bombers, or armour. And Student's Airborne Corps *just*, just managed it at appalling cost in lives - but couldn't prevent most of Creforce getting away.

    So the Fallschirmjäger drop onto Manston (the Ju52s somehow having been missed by Fighter Command, thus avoiding the greatest turkey shoot in the history of air warfare) and Seize The Airfield (Hooyah!). What then? March 70 miles to London and house-clear all the way up the A2 to Whitehall, with at most a division and a half of very, very light infantry, whilst presumably fighting in the opposite direction to secure a port and holding off brigade-sized (at least) counterattacks on the airhead at the same time?

    BTW, that the Luftwaffe effectively covered the Channel dash isn't an argument against the RAF effectively covering the RN in the Channel. It's an argument in favour. We couldn't sink the Germans because they were going very fast under all available air cover. What does that tell you about the possibilities of sinking the whole RN destroyer and cruiser force going top speed through the straits under the RAF's whole fighter force with the technology of two years before? The German ragtag water festival...sorry...invasion fleet could have been sunk by one flotilla of destroyers, and we had 70-80 of them in home waters. Say the E-boats get two before dying gloriously, and the Luftwaffe get - what? 10 seems optimistic - and you still lose, badly. That's before we get to the cruisers, of which there were more than a dozen on hand, or the Home Fleet, which could have made it in 36 hours with its skirts up.

  34. Chris Williams

    70-80 in home waters, but only 40 of them (plus c. 8 cruisers and a battleship) were less than 12 hours steaming from the invasion beaches. If anything, there were too many committed - Fraser certainly thought so: he reckoned that Ramsay could have sunk the invasion fleet with half that, and complained accordingly. The Admiralty weren't taking any chances.

    And the score from Dunkirk was 56 destroyers engaged, of which 9 sunk and 19 damaged.

    As you can infer, I've been at my Roskill this afternoon.

  35. Chris Williams

    PS: Student was unavailable for combat in the summer of 1940, on account of just having had his brains put back in by a Dutch surgeon (cheers mate - you really took that oath seriously, didn't you?). More to the point, the high-tech bits of the German army - paras, tanks, etc - had been subject to a lot of wear and tear in the western offensive. So in airborne assaults as in anti-shipping, we can't read back their capabilities of the spring of 1941 to the summer of 1941.

  36. Pontius.

    OK, - well, the reasons might have been different, - but the Germans effectively still let the AEF off the hook at Dunkirk, an error for which they would pay.
    I was being pretty tongue in cheek in mentioning the airborne assault, lol, - but I'm sure they had a plan to use their paras anyway. (How...??) Yes, Crete was later etc, - and so was Arnhem. In the later case, the lightly-armed airborne forces more or less landed on an SS Panzer division. However, they still held out for some time, as I'm sure the Germans might have done, - to no avail without support, - they were not really able to get any effective re-supplies, but then again, they weren't on an airfield.
    Turkey shoot? Well, the Fw 190 tip and run raiders managed to get across the channel at low level under the Radar, so why not Ju52's? They dropped the paras' from pretty low level anyway. Even loaded, a two to three minute climb would probably have sufficed, and then back on the deck to the land of the cheese-eaters. (Even in the age of AWACS, - still a valid strategy.) Having secured the airfield they could have been supplied as they were at Crete. German fighters might have used it and some of the fuel on site too, with cover from France as a back-up. But London - no, why bother?
    At the beginning of the war, it seems clear that the Admiralty didn't really have much of a grasp on just how much anti-aircraft firepower a ship needed to effectively protect itself without effective air-cover, evidence the debacle of the Repulse and Renown. These 40 destroyers btw - were these the concrete-bottomed rust buckets that the US lent the RN...?
    Dunkirk; 28 out of 56 destroyers sunk or damaged - and that was 'with the German's attention elsewhere'.... and only flying attacks on Dunkirk on two and a bit out of nine days... good job the Germans were all busy oiling their tanks and drinking the vino....
    'BTW, that the Luftwaffe effectively covered the Channel dash isn't an argument against the RAF effectively covering the RN in the Channel. It's an argument in favour. We couldn't sink the Germans because they were going very fast under all available air cover.' Cuts both ways doesn't it, but the fact is the Germans operation was very well planned and executed. The RAF and RN were made to look pretty innefectual. 'Going very fast'? Ships aren't exactly going to get away from aircraft.
    Do I think the Germans could have pulled off a successful invasion in late 1940? Probably not, but, handled correctly, it might have been harder-fought than some of the dismissive comments here suggest. Mostly it would have been down to the Luftwaffe. My own view is that the Germans Achilles-heel was their poor Intelligence supply and lack of suitable radar to support them at the time. Their front-line fighters were mostly better than ours, and were operated bycrews with recent combat experience using much better tactics than the RAF, at a time and place of their choosing.
    The real point of all this hot air is about the importance of the BoB. The RAF victory ensured that none of the options were put to the test, and by that measure it wasn't 'only' of importance as the Luftwaffe's first defeat. It ensured we weren't put to the test and that Hitler's attention would stray elsewhere.

  37. Chris Williams

    "the Fw 190 tip and run raiders managed to get across the channel at low level under the Radar, so why not Ju52's?"

    I'd hazard a guess that the reason might be the difference between a flight of small fighters that can do 565 kmh, and a large formation of medium-sized transport aircraft that can do 265kmh.

    "At the beginning of the war, it seems clear that the Admiralty didn't really have much of a grasp on just how much anti-aircraft firepower a ship needed to effectively protect itself without effective air-cover, "

    That's right - but by June 1940 they had already been rudely awakened, off Norway. The tactics that they adopted - stick out at sea and only send in a modern AA cruiser or sloop to defend the base - actually worked reasonably well.

    "evidence the debacle of the Repulse and Renown." You mean Prince of Wales - Renown made it to VJ Day: an important fact for me because my father-in-law was serving on her at the time.

    "These 40 destroyers btw - were these the concrete-bottomed rust buckets that the US lent the RN...?"

    No - none of those arrived before late September, and almost all went straight to the Western Approaches as escorts.

  38. Pontius, I'm not sure what you mean by "AEF" - Air Experience Flight, an organisation for taking Air Cadets up in Chipmunks? Australian Expeditionary Force? BEF, surely?

    Anyway, you're the weak-on-facts chappie who trolled soc.history.what-if for weeks with a truly deranged scheme to conquer the UK with some fishing boats or something, aren't you? Confess, we are everywhere.

    There is a pretty big difference between 9 sunk and 19 damaged (to any degree) and 28 "sunk and damaged" - note the trollish debate framing trick.

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