Comments on: The superweapon and the Anglo-American imagination -- IV http://airminded.org/2009/12/06/the-superweapon-and-the-anglo-american-imagination-iv/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=the-superweapon-and-the-anglo-american-imagination-iv Airpower and British society, 1908-1941 Thu, 09 Feb 2012 22:36:10 +0000 hourly 1 http://wordpress.org/?v=3.3.1 By: Airminded · It’s alive! http://airminded.org/2009/12/06/the-superweapon-and-the-anglo-american-imagination-iv/comment-page-2/#comment-127583 Airminded · It’s alive! Sun, 17 Jan 2010 13:58:34 +0000 http://airminded.org/?p=3008#comment-127583 [...] Marine Corps in Nicaragua — had much the same purpose. And then there’s the (alleged) American preference for security through superweapons. Still, the conversations we are now having about the ethical and political ramifications of drones [...] [...] Marine Corps in Nicaragua — had much the same purpose. And then there’s the (alleged) American preference for security through superweapons. Still, the conversations we are now having about the ethical and political ramifications of drones [...]

]]> By: JDK http://airminded.org/2009/12/06/the-superweapon-and-the-anglo-american-imagination-iv/comment-page-2/#comment-127412 JDK Fri, 15 Jan 2010 13:28:39 +0000 http://airminded.org/?p=3008#comment-127412 I have a 'please explain' for Eric. He said: <i>"The He-178 was a stunt. See Constant on the turbojet revolution, or Schabel on _Illusionen der Wunderwaffen_, which I think has been translated now."</i> I think calling the first ever successful turbojet aircraft to fly - acknowledged as such in general - 'a stunt' is a bit of an odd thing. By the criteria I presume you are implying (hence my request for clarification) any other 'first' is a 'stunt', such as the Wrights, the Montgolfiers, Lindbergh or Alcock & Brown - and so on. Or are you suggesting it was a bit of a sleight of hand rather like some Nazi sponsored records? If the criteria is that the design of engine was in some way a dead end, that doesn't stack up either, I suggest, as Heinkel <i>did</i> chose to persist with the jet - and despite discouragement and disinterest by the RLM developed the perfectly viable Heinkel He 280 and jet engines for the same. While the He 178 was a dedicated test-bed and the Gloster E28/39 had pretentious to being a fighter in the specification and design stage, they were both used as proof of concept and test beds in the end, and neither should be ignored, or casually dismissed as 'a stunt' in the history of the jet in the way that true dead-ends such as the Italian work with the Caproni Campini N.1 can perhaps justifiably be (interesting though that is as well). I have a 'please explain' for Eric.

He said:
"The He-178 was a stunt. See Constant on the turbojet revolution, or Schabel on _Illusionen der Wunderwaffen_, which I think has been translated now."

I think calling the first ever successful turbojet aircraft to fly - acknowledged as such in general - 'a stunt' is a bit of an odd thing.

By the criteria I presume you are implying (hence my request for clarification) any other 'first' is a 'stunt', such as the Wrights, the Montgolfiers, Lindbergh or Alcock & Brown - and so on. Or are you suggesting it was a bit of a sleight of hand rather like some Nazi sponsored records?

If the criteria is that the design of engine was in some way a dead end, that doesn't stack up either, I suggest, as Heinkel did chose to persist with the jet - and despite discouragement and disinterest by the RLM developed the perfectly viable Heinkel He 280 and jet engines for the same.

While the He 178 was a dedicated test-bed and the Gloster E28/39 had pretentious to being a fighter in the specification and design stage, they were both used as proof of concept and test beds in the end, and neither should be ignored, or casually dismissed as 'a stunt' in the history of the jet in the way that true dead-ends such as the Italian work with the Caproni Campini N.1 can perhaps justifiably be (interesting though that is as well).

]]> By: Airminded · To-day and to-morrow http://airminded.org/2009/12/06/the-superweapon-and-the-anglo-american-imagination-iv/comment-page-2/#comment-126671 Airminded · To-day and to-morrow Sat, 09 Jan 2010 15:52:02 +0000 http://airminded.org/?p=3008#comment-126671 [...] in Britain. Certainly, the writing, publication and reading of these books tells us something about the way the future was constructed in those countries in the early 20th century. Max Saunders, who is in the English department at King’s College London, has a research [...] [...] in Britain. Certainly, the writing, publication and reading of these books tells us something about the way the future was constructed in those countries in the early 20th century. Max Saunders, who is in the English department at King’s College London, has a research [...]

]]> By: Brett Holman http://airminded.org/2009/12/06/the-superweapon-and-the-anglo-american-imagination-iv/comment-page-2/#comment-125111 Brett Holman Mon, 28 Dec 2009 06:45:32 +0000 http://airminded.org/?p=3008#comment-125111 Ross: I don't know about archival sources, but I can't recall any published sources talking about the carrier as a superweapon in that sense. E. F. Spanner (<em>Armaments and the Non-combatanat</em>, 1927) wanted the whole air arm to be given to the RN so it would give up its battleship fixation and concentrate on carrier and other naval aviation, but even he thought only in terms of blockades and, at most, bombing enemy air and naval bases. I doubt the British would have been the ones to think along those lines: the bombers vs battleships debate was often couched in terms of cost, and if you are going to have a huge carrier fleet to carry a useful amount of bombers you've just lost the cost argument. Better to launch them off your unsinkable aircraft carrier! And while I haven't read much on the post-WW2 USN, I'd suspect that their thinking was shaped by the special circumstances of 1945: (i) Japan's air (and sea) defences were overwhelmed which meant that US carriers could cruise up and down the coast launching attacks on industrial targets with impunity; and (ii) the atomic bomb came along, raising the prospect of being able to do massive damage to industrial targets with only a carrier wing. The RN in 1919-1939 couldn't envisage operating in such an environment. Neil: '[I]magining and dreaming, but not thinking' -- I like that! I think that's about right (though they did think they had empirical evidence for, e.g., the casualty multiplier per ton of bombs dropped). If operational research (which, on some accounts, got its start in WW1 with, among other things, AA research) had been developed in the interwar years, the Air Staff might have had to re-examine their assumptions from time to time. And yes, parity was largely a numbers game, or at least it often was. The first RAF expansion programmes in 1934-5 were announced in terms of numbers of front-line aircraft being added, without any mention of what kind of aircraft they were -- not even whether they were bombers or fighters. Partly that was because numbers would demonstrate resolve to the Germans, partly because they would sooth public anxieties, and partly I think because it was just assumed that the majority of them would be bombers (which was in fact true), otherwise what would be the point? Ross:

I don't know about archival sources, but I can't recall any published sources talking about the carrier as a superweapon in that sense. E. F. Spanner (Armaments and the Non-combatanat, 1927) wanted the whole air arm to be given to the RN so it would give up its battleship fixation and concentrate on carrier and other naval aviation, but even he thought only in terms of blockades and, at most, bombing enemy air and naval bases. I doubt the British would have been the ones to think along those lines: the bombers vs battleships debate was often couched in terms of cost, and if you are going to have a huge carrier fleet to carry a useful amount of bombers you've just lost the cost argument. Better to launch them off your unsinkable aircraft carrier! And while I haven't read much on the post-WW2 USN, I'd suspect that their thinking was shaped by the special circumstances of 1945: (i) Japan's air (and sea) defences were overwhelmed which meant that US carriers could cruise up and down the coast launching attacks on industrial targets with impunity; and (ii) the atomic bomb came along, raising the prospect of being able to do massive damage to industrial targets with only a carrier wing. The RN in 1919-1939 couldn't envisage operating in such an environment.

Neil:

'[I]magining and dreaming, but not thinking' -- I like that! I think that's about right (though they did think they had empirical evidence for, e.g., the casualty multiplier per ton of bombs dropped). If operational research (which, on some accounts, got its start in WW1 with, among other things, AA research) had been developed in the interwar years, the Air Staff might have had to re-examine their assumptions from time to time.

And yes, parity was largely a numbers game, or at least it often was. The first RAF expansion programmes in 1934-5 were announced in terms of numbers of front-line aircraft being added, without any mention of what kind of aircraft they were -- not even whether they were bombers or fighters. Partly that was because numbers would demonstrate resolve to the Germans, partly because they would sooth public anxieties, and partly I think because it was just assumed that the majority of them would be bombers (which was in fact true), otherwise what would be the point?

]]> By: Neil Datson http://airminded.org/2009/12/06/the-superweapon-and-the-anglo-american-imagination-iv/comment-page-2/#comment-124582 Neil Datson Wed, 23 Dec 2009 08:27:24 +0000 http://airminded.org/?p=3008#comment-124582 Certainly Christopher, the imagination is always relevant to air power. (Probably much more in the inter-war years than after WWII.) Imagination clearly plays a vital role in understanding its impact on popular perceptions. Perhaps the problem with British inter-war air doctrine was this: British policy makers and planners used too much imagination in assessing its uses. They didn't look for empirical evidence. (In Higham's The Military Intellectuals in Britain there is an off-hand and rather snide reference to the RAF Staff College - 'its hard to find any evidence of any thinking being done' - I paraphrase from memory.) Possibly they were imagining and dreaming, but not thinking. Here's a thought. The speed of warplanes, the 'Flying Pencil' etc, caused a stir. Why should it have mattered a damn if the bomber was always going to get through? Why not simply focus on their payload? Certainly Christopher, the imagination is always relevant to air power. (Probably much more in the inter-war years than after WWII.) Imagination clearly plays a vital role in understanding its impact on popular perceptions.

Perhaps the problem with British inter-war air doctrine was this: British policy makers and planners used too much imagination in assessing its uses. They didn't look for empirical evidence. (In Higham's The Military Intellectuals in Britain there is an off-hand and rather snide reference to the RAF Staff College - 'its hard to find any evidence of any thinking being done' - I paraphrase from memory.) Possibly they were imagining and dreaming, but not thinking.

Here's a thought. The speed of warplanes, the 'Flying Pencil' etc, caused a stir. Why should it have mattered a damn if the bomber was always going to get through? Why not simply focus on their payload?

]]> By: Christopher Amano-Langtree http://airminded.org/2009/12/06/the-superweapon-and-the-anglo-american-imagination-iv/comment-page-2/#comment-124573 Christopher Amano-Langtree Wed, 23 Dec 2009 01:58:25 +0000 http://airminded.org/?p=3008#comment-124573 Indeed we have drifted off the topic of imagination slightly but how air power is used is a function of imagination I would suggest. Take the Luftwaffe - this was a tactical airforce as its early experiences had been of that nature (the rebuilding and Spain in particular). It never really developed a strategic vision even though there were attempts to do so. Throughout the war it remained tactical in nature and its ventures into the strategic realm were half hearted. Nazi propaganda (from what I have seen) emphasised this aspect to the exclusion of the strategic and the bureaucracy. The Royal Air Force however did develop a strategic vision but without ever really definining it. Admittedly with the dullards who were in charge between the wars this might have been beyond their capacity but also things were rather new (Budiansky is very good on this problem). When it came for the RAF to perform a tactical role this was resisted (See Neilllands - The Bomber War). Harris had to be forced to give up his strategic bombers for tactical purposes and did so very grudgingly. Between the wars Churchill did play the numbers game and did it well. But there was a certain amount of naivity to this. German figures were accepted a bit too readily. I have argued that I believe that conservatism was at the base of this issue. If one watches film of the Hendon air pagents one does not see a modern airforce - in fact it all looks like it would have fitted nicely into the First World War environment. What I have seen of the British imagination with regard to super weapons only really begins to develop in the late '30s when the threat from Germany and the fascist dictatorships was becoming more difficult to ignore. Indeed we have drifted off the topic of imagination slightly but how air power is used is a function of imagination I would suggest. Take the Luftwaffe - this was a tactical airforce as its early experiences had been of that nature (the rebuilding and Spain in particular). It never really developed a strategic vision even though there were attempts to do so. Throughout the war it remained tactical in nature and its ventures into the strategic realm were half hearted. Nazi propaganda (from what I have seen) emphasised this aspect to the exclusion of the strategic and the bureaucracy. The Royal Air Force however did develop a strategic vision but without ever really definining it. Admittedly with the dullards who were in charge between the wars this might have been beyond their capacity but also things were rather new (Budiansky is very good on this problem). When it came for the RAF to perform a tactical role this was resisted (See Neilllands - The Bomber War). Harris had to be forced to give up his strategic bombers for tactical purposes and did so very grudgingly.
Between the wars Churchill did play the numbers game and did it well. But there was a certain amount of naivity to this. German figures were accepted a bit too readily. I have argued that I believe that conservatism was at the base of this issue. If one watches film of the Hendon air pagents one does not see a modern airforce - in fact it all looks like it would have fitted nicely into the First World War environment. What I have seen of the British imagination with regard to super weapons only really begins to develop in the late '30s when the threat from Germany and the fascist dictatorships was becoming more difficult to ignore.

]]> By: Neil Datson http://airminded.org/2009/12/06/the-superweapon-and-the-anglo-american-imagination-iv/comment-page-2/#comment-124553 Neil Datson Tue, 22 Dec 2009 20:02:28 +0000 http://airminded.org/?p=3008#comment-124553 All very interesting, but I'm not clear how closely the development of differing strands of air doctrine relates to Brett's topic. But perhaps it does: As I understand it, in the 1930s Britain was involved in an arms race to build more bombers than Nazi Germany. But the Nazis declined to join in the race. However, the British were undeterred, and raced them nevertheless. In the Dreadnought era, there was a race between Britain and Germany to build . . . Dreadnoughts. Each new class of battleships or battlecruisers was compared for easily measurable qualities, especially the main armament and weight of broadside. These comparisons were celebrated - or lamented - in the popular press. (In Britain at least.) Did the same thing happen with the bombers, or was it merely a numbers game? A country whose populace puts its faith in a means of defence (in this case bombers) but whose populace has no obvious interest in the relative efficacy of that means, seems a strange country to me. Come the 1930s, did the British think that warplanes were, of themselves, a super weapon, and there was no point in looking for an even more super weapon? All very interesting, but I'm not clear how closely the development of differing strands of air doctrine relates to Brett's topic.

But perhaps it does:

As I understand it, in the 1930s Britain was involved in an arms race to build more bombers than Nazi Germany. But the Nazis declined to join in the race. However, the British were undeterred, and raced them nevertheless.

In the Dreadnought era, there was a race between Britain and Germany to build . . . Dreadnoughts. Each new class of battleships or battlecruisers was compared for easily measurable qualities, especially the main armament and weight of broadside. These comparisons were celebrated - or lamented - in the popular press. (In Britain at least.) Did the same thing happen with the bombers, or was it merely a numbers game?

A country whose populace puts its faith in a means of defence (in this case bombers) but whose populace has no obvious interest in the relative efficacy of that means, seems a strange country to me.

Come the 1930s, did the British think that warplanes were, of themselves, a super weapon, and there was no point in looking for an even more super weapon?

]]> By: Ross http://airminded.org/2009/12/06/the-superweapon-and-the-anglo-american-imagination-iv/comment-page-2/#comment-124518 Ross Tue, 22 Dec 2009 14:05:43 +0000 http://airminded.org/?p=3008#comment-124518 The RAF does not simply focus on 'strategic' air power in the inter-war years. A closer look at the archival evidence and writing of the period indicates that. The RAF's operating doctrine of the period, AP 1300, covers all forms of aerial operations and indeed in the section dealing with bomberdment does not use the term 'strategic' but discusses aerial bombardment. As to the RAF, in particular Bomber Command, not supporting D-Day yes Harris was difficult to work with and did argue his point but once ordered to cooperate he did. This was the same for the Americans/ The key reason they were more co-operative is becuase the target set for the 'heavies' in preperation for D-Day i.e. the transportation network, fitted in the the industrial web theory that was popular at the ACTS during the inter-war years. If it had not then Spaatz would have put up more resistance. As for the Luftwaffe the key reason that the main drive of the Operational Air War doctrine moves away from strategic bombing has more to do with the mismanagement of Jeschonnek and Udet than doctrine. Indeed Corum's work on the Lufwaffe argues that the Luftwaffe does not reject strategic bombing and that it only after the death of Wever that ideas are diluted. Strategic bombing as an adjunct to the land battle reamerges in Russia when the Luftwaffe is used to bomb Russian oilfields. This is where the impact of Udet/Jeschonnek is realy felt. The Luftwaffe has a comprehensive doctrine at the outbreak of the war and in regards to bombing has much better navigational aids than the RAF. Much of the Luftwaffe in the early campaigns is directed at operational level target such of airfield and transportation systems and not utilised in the tactical zone of operations. The key unit that supported german mobile operations was VIII Flieger Corps but the rest of the German Army suffered from a lack of support as the rest of the Luftwaffe was employed elsewhere attacking targets inside enemy territory. The RAF does not simply focus on 'strategic' air power in the inter-war years. A closer look at the archival evidence and writing of the period indicates that. The RAF's operating doctrine of the period, AP 1300, covers all forms of aerial operations and indeed in the section dealing with bomberdment does not use the term 'strategic' but discusses aerial bombardment. As to the RAF, in particular Bomber Command, not supporting D-Day yes Harris was difficult to work with and did argue his point but once ordered to cooperate he did. This was the same for the Americans/ The key reason they were more co-operative is becuase the target set for the 'heavies' in preperation for D-Day i.e. the transportation network, fitted in the the industrial web theory that was popular at the ACTS during the inter-war years. If it had not then Spaatz would have put up more resistance. As for the Luftwaffe the key reason that the main drive of the Operational Air War doctrine moves away from strategic bombing has more to do with the mismanagement of Jeschonnek and Udet than doctrine. Indeed Corum's work on the Lufwaffe argues that the Luftwaffe does not reject strategic bombing and that it only after the death of Wever that ideas are diluted. Strategic bombing as an adjunct to the land battle reamerges in Russia when the Luftwaffe is used to bomb Russian oilfields. This is where the impact of Udet/Jeschonnek is realy felt. The Luftwaffe has a comprehensive doctrine at the outbreak of the war and in regards to bombing has much better navigational aids than the RAF. Much of the Luftwaffe in the early campaigns is directed at operational level target such of airfield and transportation systems and not utilised in the tactical zone of operations. The key unit that supported german mobile operations was VIII Flieger Corps but the rest of the German Army suffered from a lack of support as the rest of the Luftwaffe was employed elsewhere attacking targets inside enemy territory.

]]> By: Christopher Amano-Langtree http://airminded.org/2009/12/06/the-superweapon-and-the-anglo-american-imagination-iv/comment-page-2/#comment-124512 Christopher Amano-Langtree Tue, 22 Dec 2009 13:36:06 +0000 http://airminded.org/?p=3008#comment-124512 I am not suggesting things in such stark terms - rather that the RAF between the wars focused on the strategic function and that this continued into WW2. The RAF literally had to be forced to allocate resources to the tactical bombing needed before the D-Day landings. Imperial policing was a rather serendipitous discovery which allowed the RAF to survive. As a practical policy it was a complete failure causing resentment and weakening Imperial authority. There is ample evidence for the Luftwaffe focus on the tactical element to the exclusion of th strategic element. On looks at the campaigns in Poland, the Low Countries and the Battle of France for examples. Strategic bombing was not a concern and the main drive was away from this area. Consequently when the Luftwaffe tried this they failed. I am not suggesting things in such stark terms - rather that the RAF between the wars focused on the strategic function and that this continued into WW2. The RAF literally had to be forced to allocate resources to the tactical bombing needed before the D-Day landings. Imperial policing was a rather serendipitous discovery which allowed the RAF to survive. As a practical policy it was a complete failure causing resentment and weakening Imperial authority.
There is ample evidence for the Luftwaffe focus on the tactical element to the exclusion of th strategic element. On looks at the campaigns in Poland, the Low Countries and the Battle of France for examples. Strategic bombing was not a concern and the main drive was away from this area. Consequently when the Luftwaffe tried this they failed.

]]> By: Ross http://airminded.org/2009/12/06/the-superweapon-and-the-anglo-american-imagination-iv/comment-page-2/#comment-124498 Ross Tue, 22 Dec 2009 12:05:35 +0000 http://airminded.org/?p=3008#comment-124498 Christopher your contention the the RAF was a strategic air force and the Luftwaffe was a tactical air force is highly contentious. Yes the RAF believed in the efficacy of the bomber but it did not ignore other areas as has commonly been argued but I disagree the british avaition took a 'big mistep' in the inter-war years. The RAF's key concern for much of the 20's was imperial policing and many of the methods emplyed filtered into other areas of the service. In the realm of tactical air power it had two key theorists in the shape of Leigh-Mallory and Slessor. Yes there were problems, the key one being that being an independent air force struggling for survival in the face of finanacial cuts while being pulled in several doctrinal directions. On the issue of air support the RAF participated fully in the development of doctrine and actually called for a wholistic Joint Doctrine as they saw all war as Combined Operations with the primary concern of air power being the maintanance of air superiority before any other form of air power could be applied. In this they were correct. The Americans suffered from the problem of penny packeting their air power, see the failure of US tactical at Kasserine Pass after which they adopt British doctrine. It is not until the middle of the war that they realise that the key advanatge of a ir power is concentration at any one point and that trying to even it out across various forces meant the most they could achieve was a degree of local air superiority. As for the Germans being a tactical air force again this is not true. German doctrine operated at the operational level, hence its name the Operational Air War, it was designed to be able to be a jack of all trades in many respects, therefore, problems were encoutered in many areas. It problem with strategic sir power stems from a lack of suitable aircraft and a decision by Udet and Jeschonnek to make all aircraft dive bombers and retarded the prodcution of four engined bombers. Indeed the HE-177 was redesigned with this in mind. Thankfully recent shifts in the historiography of air power has started to disprove these orthodox opinion of the inter-war history of bothe the RAF and Luftwaffe. Indeed we have started to shift to a middle ground where it is recognised that both air force took time to consider the application of air power's role in war and who it could influence the conduct of war. The indivisibility of air is not sustainable but the instution utlising air power must remeber its core tenants of use such as concentration of power to achieve air superiority from which all other application can flow. Christopher your contention the the RAF was a strategic air force and the Luftwaffe was a tactical air force is highly contentious. Yes the RAF believed in the efficacy of the bomber but it did not ignore other areas as has commonly been argued but I disagree the british avaition took a 'big mistep' in the inter-war years. The RAF's key concern for much of the 20's was imperial policing and many of the methods emplyed filtered into other areas of the service. In the realm of tactical air power it had two key theorists in the shape of Leigh-Mallory and Slessor. Yes there were problems, the key one being that being an independent air force struggling for survival in the face of finanacial cuts while being pulled in several doctrinal directions. On the issue of air support the RAF participated fully in the development of doctrine and actually called for a wholistic Joint Doctrine as they saw all war as Combined Operations with the primary concern of air power being the maintanance of air superiority before any other form of air power could be applied. In this they were correct. The Americans suffered from the problem of penny packeting their air power, see the failure of US tactical at Kasserine Pass after which they adopt British doctrine. It is not until the middle of the war that they realise that the key advanatge of a ir power is concentration at any one point and that trying to even it out across various forces meant the most they could achieve was a degree of local air superiority. As for the Germans being a tactical air force again this is not true. German doctrine operated at the operational level, hence its name the Operational Air War, it was designed to be able to be a jack of all trades in many respects, therefore, problems were encoutered in many areas. It problem with strategic sir power stems from a lack of suitable aircraft and a decision by Udet and Jeschonnek to make all aircraft dive bombers and retarded the prodcution of four engined bombers. Indeed the HE-177 was redesigned with this in mind. Thankfully recent shifts in the historiography of air power has started to disprove these orthodox opinion of the inter-war history of bothe the RAF and Luftwaffe. Indeed we have started to shift to a middle ground where it is recognised that both air force took time to consider the application of air power's role in war and who it could influence the conduct of war. The indivisibility of air is not sustainable but the instution utlising air power must remeber its core tenants of use such as concentration of power to achieve air superiority from which all other application can flow.

]]>