On the matter of Zeppelins, in 1914 the dirigibles had a considerable performance advantage, especially if the defender had to climb 10-15,000 feet or more (near or above the ceilings of many of the aircraft available) to intercept so it was by no means a no-brainer that the Zeppelins would fail.

Despite modern conceptions of the flamibility of Zeppelins, they were surprisingly difficult to shoot down even with incendiary ammunition and I recall reading an account of an entire drum of ammunition being fired into one to no effect. An entire arsenal of weapons was tried, and discarded. Explosive darts, rockets, bombs and various types of special guns failed.
They would only ignite when oxygen was mixed with the hydrogen. It was discovered that the best tactic was to shoot across the edge of the curve rather than directly into the side as that caused more venting, and the incendiaries spent more time where the air and hydrogen could mix, rather than deep inside the ballon. Hydrogen is actually less flamable than gasoline.

Probably the biggest factor in their demise was that their speed and altitude advantages disappeared, leaving them open for repeated attacks until someone could get that fatal shot.
As aircraft speeds, climb rates and ceilings further improved, the odds went spectacularly in the favour of the attacker. Very much the same story for any bomber coming to the end of its service life in wartime, and not all that different that the fate suffered by many of the Japanese aircraft of WW2. I was sure that more had been shot down than 6 – that sounds way too low (perhaps that is only the ones shot down over the UK?)

Perhaps most telling is that hydrogen filled observation ballons continued to be used by both sides throughout the war.

Cheers,

Mike

Yes, the ultimate cause for the failure of the Zeppelins was that they were pretty useless, but the proximate cause was, in part, because the defenders got their act together and started shooting them down! None at all were shot down by fighters before September 1916, and then six were shot down before the end of the year, five by fighters and one by AA. As Chris says, incendiaries made a huge difference. More so than the barrage line as such, but it seems to have been well-placed for interception.

JDK:

Yes, it’s very true that maps can be political in nature, but I doubt that these ones are meant to be reassuring, because one of the conclusions of the official history was that ‘the only defence in the air likely be effective in the long run is an offensive more powerfully sustained than that conducted by an enemy’ (vol. 5, 149). Jones (and Raleigh, the original official historian) were pretty Trenchardian.

The Barrage system brought in against the V-1s in W.W.II worked on a viable ‘bands of defence’ system. Given the nature of the attacks there, it made more sense than the politically popular ‘walls of lead’ type defences which generally failed to shoot down many (any?) raiders in either war.

I suspect these maps are in part the result of self-comforting propaganda and a different availability of alternative images in the era.

The main thing to remember was the raids forced a lot of units that should have been thumping the Hun getting brought to the UK to save politician’s seats. It was a German victory, but just not a big enough one for them.

A recent History Today magazine has an interesting article on maps in war and propaganda.