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	<title>Comments on: The persistence of fear</title>
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	<link>http://airminded.org/2008/07/22/the-persistence-of-fear/</link>
	<description>Airpower and British society, 1908-1941</description>
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		<title>By: Brett Holman</title>
		<link>http://airminded.org/2008/07/22/the-persistence-of-fear/comment-page-1/#comment-79354</link>
		<dc:creator>Brett Holman</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 30 Jul 2008 14:42:24 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://airminded.org/?p=531#comment-79354</guid>
		<description>&lt;blockquote&gt;But Nicholson’s entries are useful if they help us to restore the sense of uncertainty that there was in Britain over the winter of 1940-41.&lt;/blockquote&gt;

Yes, exactly, that&#039;s one of the things I like about reading predictions about the future (which is so much of what I do).  Sometimes I wish I could (temporarily!) forget everything that happened after my period, so I could escape the dead hand of chronology ...

True enough that one shouldn&#039;t extrapolate from diary entries. But as I say there are other sources saying similar things. On Alex -- it seems a fine line between pessimism and realism when he&#039;s talking about British cities being blotted out one by one! But I don&#039;t know enough about his personality to judge.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<blockquote><p>But Nicholson’s entries are useful if they help us to restore the sense of uncertainty that there was in Britain over the winter of 1940-41.</p></blockquote>
<p>Yes, exactly, that&#8217;s one of the things I like about reading predictions about the future (which is so much of what I do).  Sometimes I wish I could (temporarily!) forget everything that happened after my period, so I could escape the dead hand of chronology &#8230;</p>
<p>True enough that one shouldn&#8217;t extrapolate from diary entries. But as I say there are other sources saying similar things. On Alex &#8212; it seems a fine line between pessimism and realism when he&#8217;s talking about British cities being blotted out one by one! But I don&#8217;t know enough about his personality to judge.</p>
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		<title>By: Dan</title>
		<link>http://airminded.org/2008/07/22/the-persistence-of-fear/comment-page-1/#comment-79327</link>
		<dc:creator>Dan</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 30 Jul 2008 09:49:31 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://airminded.org/?p=531#comment-79327</guid>
		<description>I think it&#039;s dangerous to extrapolate from individual diary entries - too subject to individual experiences, perceptions and fluctuations in mood. But Nicholson&#039;s entries are useful if they help us to restore the sense of uncertainty that there was in Britain over the winter of 1940-41. If you take away the certainty that Hitler was going to attack Russia - which even senior British strategists didn&#039;t have until much closer to the event - it was hard to maintain a positive sense of what would happen in the short term. We might have beaten the Italians in the Mediterranean, but the British didn&#039;t seem capable of stopping night time air raids. Roosevelt might have announced Lend Lease, but it wasn&#039;t past Congress, and Britain had just run out of dollars. It doesn&#039;t seem unreasonable to me to have presumed in this context that 1941 would see another attempt to knock Britain out of the war from the air, this time improved by all the experience the Luftwaffe had gained in 1940, plus the productive resources of the expanded Reich (we know that German air production had stalled, but who would have thought that at the time?). None of that necessarily meant that Britain was going to lose in the long run (and Alexander&#039;s comment doesn&#039;t seem pessimistic to me, more like a bit of typically debonair realism) - but it did mean that things were probably going to get worse before they got better. To a degree, this is what happened: the bombing raids of May 1941 were more severe than those of autumn 1940.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I think it&#8217;s dangerous to extrapolate from individual diary entries &#8211; too subject to individual experiences, perceptions and fluctuations in mood. But Nicholson&#8217;s entries are useful if they help us to restore the sense of uncertainty that there was in Britain over the winter of 1940-41. If you take away the certainty that Hitler was going to attack Russia &#8211; which even senior British strategists didn&#8217;t have until much closer to the event &#8211; it was hard to maintain a positive sense of what would happen in the short term. We might have beaten the Italians in the Mediterranean, but the British didn&#8217;t seem capable of stopping night time air raids. Roosevelt might have announced Lend Lease, but it wasn&#8217;t past Congress, and Britain had just run out of dollars. It doesn&#8217;t seem unreasonable to me to have presumed in this context that 1941 would see another attempt to knock Britain out of the war from the air, this time improved by all the experience the Luftwaffe had gained in 1940, plus the productive resources of the expanded Reich (we know that German air production had stalled, but who would have thought that at the time?). None of that necessarily meant that Britain was going to lose in the long run (and Alexander&#8217;s comment doesn&#8217;t seem pessimistic to me, more like a bit of typically debonair realism) &#8211; but it did mean that things were probably going to get worse before they got better. To a degree, this is what happened: the bombing raids of May 1941 were more severe than those of autumn 1940.</p>
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		<title>By: Brett Holman</title>
		<link>http://airminded.org/2008/07/22/the-persistence-of-fear/comment-page-1/#comment-79191</link>
		<dc:creator>Brett Holman</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 29 Jul 2008 11:47:26 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://airminded.org/?p=531#comment-79191</guid>
		<description>Obviously Nicolson was wrong about the knock-out blow being still on its way (unless those crafty Germans are still biding their time ...) but that&#039;s beside the point, which is that the idea was in the air at the time. It wasn&#039;t just Nicolson who reported rumours like this, either -- H. G. Wells did too, for example, at about the same time. (He attributed them to unnamed appeasers, which may or may not be true for Alexander and Spens, but seems doubtful in Nicolson&#039;s case.)

Your last line about Alex seems to me to be right on target, so to speak, Alex. Nothing for him to do while the Germans came by air ... maybe he wished for an invasion so he fight them properly? Looks like there hasn&#039;t been a biography of Alex since 1973 ... which was written by Nicolson&#039;s son!</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Obviously Nicolson was wrong about the knock-out blow being still on its way (unless those crafty Germans are still biding their time &#8230;) but that&#8217;s beside the point, which is that the idea was in the air at the time. It wasn&#8217;t just Nicolson who reported rumours like this, either &#8212; H. G. Wells did too, for example, at about the same time. (He attributed them to unnamed appeasers, which may or may not be true for Alexander and Spens, but seems doubtful in Nicolson&#8217;s case.)</p>
<p>Your last line about Alex seems to me to be right on target, so to speak, Alex. Nothing for him to do while the Germans came by air &#8230; maybe he wished for an invasion so he fight them properly? Looks like there hasn&#8217;t been a biography of Alex since 1973 &#8230; which was written by Nicolson&#8217;s son!</p>
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		<title>By: Alex</title>
		<link>http://airminded.org/2008/07/22/the-persistence-of-fear/comment-page-1/#comment-78938</link>
		<dc:creator>Alex</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 27 Jul 2008 21:40:29 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://airminded.org/?p=531#comment-78938</guid>
		<description>Nicolson was a fun diarist but not really a serious person, ever. An amateur gent who was usually wrong.

I wonder at his account of Alexander&#039;s mood. Alex(!) won his spurs in the Retreat from Mons as a 2Lt, was decorated again in the retreat of March, 1918 as a major commanding a scratch brigade, was the last British commander at Dunkirk, flew into Rangoon to organise the breakout in 1942, took a leading part in sorting out the mess after Kasserine Pass, and went straight to Salerno when it turned shitty. Being so depressed by bombing sounds well out of character. Although, of course, in this case he wasn&#039;t an actor - just a target.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Nicolson was a fun diarist but not really a serious person, ever. An amateur gent who was usually wrong.</p>
<p>I wonder at his account of Alexander&#8217;s mood. Alex(!) won his spurs in the Retreat from Mons as a 2Lt, was decorated again in the retreat of March, 1918 as a major commanding a scratch brigade, was the last British commander at Dunkirk, flew into Rangoon to organise the breakout in 1942, took a leading part in sorting out the mess after Kasserine Pass, and went straight to Salerno when it turned shitty. Being so depressed by bombing sounds well out of character. Although, of course, in this case he wasn&#8217;t an actor &#8211; just a target.</p>
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		<title>By: Brett Holman</title>
		<link>http://airminded.org/2008/07/22/the-persistence-of-fear/comment-page-1/#comment-78302</link>
		<dc:creator>Brett Holman</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 23 Jul 2008 13:07:35 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://airminded.org/?p=531#comment-78302</guid>
		<description>No, I&#039;ve quoted pretty much all there is that&#039;s relevant. I can only speculate! (1) A hangover of the prewar belief that the attempted knock-out blow is inevitable -- it hasn&#039;t happened yet -- therefore it must be coming in the future. (2) Mid-winter blues, city after city is getting blitzed, there&#039;s no effective defence against the night bomber, no prospect of an end to the war any time soon. (3) Over the winter, Germany with all that Nazi efficiency, has been rebuilding its air force faster than Britain has.  (4) Spring is coming, and presumably invasion, and with it a renewed air offensive.  (5) A belief that Germany had been holding back in 1940, that it still had huge reserves left.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>No, I&#8217;ve quoted pretty much all there is that&#8217;s relevant. I can only speculate! (1) A hangover of the prewar belief that the attempted knock-out blow is inevitable &#8212; it hasn&#8217;t happened yet &#8212; therefore it must be coming in the future. (2) Mid-winter blues, city after city is getting blitzed, there&#8217;s no effective defence against the night bomber, no prospect of an end to the war any time soon. (3) Over the winter, Germany with all that Nazi efficiency, has been rebuilding its air force faster than Britain has.  (4) Spring is coming, and presumably invasion, and with it a renewed air offensive.  (5) A belief that Germany had been holding back in 1940, that it still had huge reserves left.</p>
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		<title>By: Gavin</title>
		<link>http://airminded.org/2008/07/22/the-persistence-of-fear/comment-page-1/#comment-78290</link>
		<dc:creator>Gavin</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 23 Jul 2008 07:26:30 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://airminded.org/?p=531#comment-78290</guid>
		<description>This is very surprising. Did they give any clue about what reason they thought the Germans had for not unleashing their knockout blow earlier?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>This is very surprising. Did they give any clue about what reason they thought the Germans had for not unleashing their knockout blow earlier?</p>
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