Yes, that scenario does sound familiar, and again it’s why conspiracy theories seem unnecessary. Surprise and the sudden blinding of Sydney seems sufficient to explain the result, especially given their relatively equal armaments.

Just a pedantic point: the correct prefix for a RAN ship’s name is HMAS, ‘His Majesty’s Australian Ship’ (or ‘Her’, as it is presently). Thus HMAS Sydney.

I’m a loooonnnggg time naval history buff and the great sea raiders (any nation and era) are on my short list. The Pacific below ~20 north in general seems a hot spot going back to the era of the Spanish Empire (and who can say what went on before then). After looking up SMS Emden and SMS Seeadler (WW1), the battle between RANS Sydney and KMS Cormoran wasn’t hard to find.

Not discussed here yet: there are some who feel that Cormoran lured Sydney “beyond common war curtousy” as one local to me put it. Meaning Capt. Detmers’ didn’t run up the war flag moments before firing. I would generally say no to this as German surface officers of any recent era have about the best rep possible for following the conventions of the sea in this regard. One can only realistically say that the Cormoran’s disguise must have been impressive and perhaps only exceeded by Count von Luckner’s Seeadler. My sincere regards to all who still have a tender spot about the outcome.

I also have played a minitures wargame over this scenario a while ago (1st Gulf War) we called the Q-ship scenario. We supposed the Straits of Hormuz as a location. An American frigate (I think it was the USS TAYLOR, FFG 50, 1990’s weapons) escorting a line of loaded tankers going east and a Chinese built and Arab crewed ship on the return west as the adversary, mounting 2 torps and 4 x 6″ guns a side plus big RPG’s and 4 x 20 mm AA (all single mounts). It was in a line of other empty ships as cover and, as the seas are narrow and Iran close, the lines a sea mile apart. We gave the escort a helicoptor in the air and the Arabs first draw with a dozen RPG zodiacs as a diversion from the coast of Iran. One of the Taylor’s tankers was allowed a pair of 50 cals as she was used in the Malacca Straits run or something (Ausy Captain?) The results weren’t pretty. 3 tankers holed, 2 tankers beached and burning. The escort gets beatup at 60% damage level (one torp hit and 25 x 6″ rounds and a nasty spray of 20 mm). All the terrorists are krispy kritters and their ship a smoking hole in the ocean eventually. (The F-14 air cover was dice rolled as 20 minutes response but not needed). The key was the concentration on the Taylor’s control and detection centers. Sound familiar?

The investigation of the wreck seems to give no support to the conspiracy theories. A majority of the lifeboats were found with the wreck, so the crew presumably weren’t machine-gunned by the Germans (or the Japanese). It appears that Kormoran’s torpedo hit the Sydney’s bow, which literally fell off as the Sydney drifted (or possibly steamed) away. It therefore sunk very suddenly, which probably explains why there were no survivors.

And they showed Detmers’ dictionary, the source of the secret account I mentioned in the previous comment (certain words were marked with pencil dots, which apparently adds up to a coherent account of the battle). I would have liked to learn more about this — apparently it was one of the wreckhunters who discovered this, so it’s unclear if any historians have been near it. Anyway, it wasn’t the sole clue for the searchers, as they were modifying the search area right up to the day they sailed based on information about currents and so on.

“Having spent over a month on board the raider, it had become clear to the crew of the Mareeba that Detmers ‘had a soft spot’ for Australians in particular, and other ‘Anglo-Saxons’ in general, as they received more privileges than the other nationalities among the Kormoran’s prisoners.

But this favouritism reached new and unexpected heights one evening in August, when two German officers, one of whom was apparently the raider’s navigator, entered the Australian’s quarters and presented them with four bottles of rum!”

but then who can tell?

That’s what I don’t get. It’s pretty easy to see what happened, why all the speculation based on no evidence — or at least, no reliable evidence — whatsoever? There’s an interesting thread at the Key Publishing forum which suggests that the rumours began very soon after the loss of the Sydney, and that they had their origins in the RAN’s embarrassment — at best, because very little information was given out, though there are hints that there was some sort of semi-official backing given to the submarine story. I don’t know whether any of that is true, I’m sure Tom Frame or somebody must have looked at the wartime rumours.

On the signals sent or not sent, a reader sent me this interesting link via email: http://www.dsd.gov.au/sigint/hmas_sydney.html

(And yes, she was pleasing to the eye, wasn’t she?)

Ric:

Thanks for your comment and your corrections! (That’s what happens when I stray outside my usual sphere of incompetence …)

Minor irritating technical point: during WW II the Royal Navy operated their fleet destroyers in flotillas, not squadrons. Each flotilla usually had two divisions. At Cape Spada SYDNEY was operating in a support of a division of destroyers and this terminology is reflected in Collins’ report of the action.