Comments on: The day of the parashot http://airminded.org/2008/01/26/the-day-of-the-parashot/ Airpower and British society, 1908-1941 Sun, 12 Oct 2008 05:23:48 +0000 http://wordpress.org/?v=2.6.1 By: Brett Holman http://airminded.org/2008/01/26/the-day-of-the-parashot/#comment-70236 Brett Holman Tue, 12 Feb 2008 14:37:42 +0000 http://airminded.org/2008/01/26/the-day-of-the-parashot/#comment-70236 Dan: I think it could well be both -- I'm reminded (as ever) of the phantom airships. The 1909 scare was more about fear of being spied upon than the fear of being bombed; the 1913 one was the other way around. But fears are slippery things and no doubt slipped from one to the other very easily. Chris: You're forgiven, I'll have forgotten the spoiler by the time I get to see it, if ever. Dan:

I think it could well be both — I’m reminded (as ever) of the phantom airships. The 1909 scare was more about fear of being spied upon than the fear of being bombed; the 1913 one was the other way around. But fears are slippery things and no doubt slipped from one to the other very easily.

Chris:

You’re forgiven, I’ll have forgotten the spoiler by the time I get to see it, if ever.

]]> By: Chris Williams http://airminded.org/2008/01/26/the-day-of-the-parashot/#comment-70035 Chris Williams Sat, 09 Feb 2008 10:31:50 +0000 http://airminded.org/2008/01/26/the-day-of-the-parashot/#comment-70035 Hey, I bunged in loads of anti-spoiler lines just then but the clever software deleted them all. Soz. Hey, I bunged in loads of anti-spoiler lines just then but the clever software deleted them all. Soz.

]]> By: Chris Williams http://airminded.org/2008/01/26/the-day-of-the-parashot/#comment-70034 Chris Williams Sat, 09 Feb 2008 10:29:39 +0000 http://airminded.org/2008/01/26/the-day-of-the-parashot/#comment-70034 Spoiler alert for 'Miss Grant Goes To The Door' Sohot him wtih the ptisol you jsut took from the bdoy of a daed Gemarn ariamn. If none to hand, adopt plan b. Spoiler alert for ‘Miss Grant Goes To The Door’

Sohot him wtih the ptisol you jsut took from the bdoy of a daed Gemarn ariamn. If none to hand, adopt plan b.

]]> By: Dan http://airminded.org/2008/01/26/the-day-of-the-parashot/#comment-70013 Dan Fri, 08 Feb 2008 21:39:08 +0000 http://airminded.org/2008/01/26/the-day-of-the-parashot/#comment-70013 The best thing about an insidious threat, of course, is that just because you can't see it doesn't mean it isn't there. And it's interesting to me how many wartime myths about German paratroopers are about them being disguised. I wonder if this is really about a fear of aerial assault, or a fear of the enemy within, or both? Time to watch my copy of Miss Grant Answers the Door and find out what to do if the foe appears! The best thing about an insidious threat, of course, is that just because you can’t see it doesn’t mean it isn’t there. And it’s interesting to me how many wartime myths about German paratroopers are about them being disguised. I wonder if this is really about a fear of aerial assault, or a fear of the enemy within, or both? Time to watch my copy of Miss Grant Answers the Door and find out what to do if the foe appears!

]]> By: Brett Holman http://airminded.org/2008/01/26/the-day-of-the-parashot/#comment-69906 Brett Holman Thu, 07 Feb 2008 04:11:15 +0000 http://airminded.org/2008/01/26/the-day-of-the-parashot/#comment-69906 Sorry, didn't mean to twist your arm, Dan! Well, actually I suppose I did -- I partly had your phoney war talk in mind when I wrote the post so I'm glad to have your thoughts. It's interesting that you say that the chronology usually isn't made clear enough. I actually wasn't sure if it was actually the way this period has been written about, or whether it's my fault as a reader. I mean I'm sure I must have come across sentences like 'On 14 May, Eden broadcast an appeal for volunteers ...' etc, and maybe it's just my usual focus on the air war and Sealion that made my eyes slide over it. Whichever, reading that section of Gillies' book was a real OMG! moment for me. Thanks for the Campbell reference. It's interesting that the WO was more worried about gliders and airlandings. I did get that impression from Gillies, actually, but it also seemed that the public fears were much more about paratroopers. I think they seemed more insidious somehow. Somewhat akin to 'enemy in our midst' spy fears from the pre-WWI period -- paratroopers could drop from the sky and land <em>anywhere</em>, even your own backyard! And if nobody saw them land then they could potentially pretend to be <em>one of us</em> and do god knows what mischief. Whereas gliders and airlanded troops by their nature would be used more like regular units, to concentrate and capture objectives by force. Of course paratroopers would have been used like that too, but I'm not sure that the public understanding went that far. Sorry, didn’t mean to twist your arm, Dan! Well, actually I suppose I did — I partly had your phoney war talk in mind when I wrote the post so I’m glad to have your thoughts. It’s interesting that you say that the chronology usually isn’t made clear enough. I actually wasn’t sure if it was actually the way this period has been written about, or whether it’s my fault as a reader. I mean I’m sure I must have come across sentences like ‘On 14 May, Eden broadcast an appeal for volunteers …’ etc, and maybe it’s just my usual focus on the air war and Sealion that made my eyes slide over it. Whichever, reading that section of Gillies’ book was a real OMG! moment for me.

Thanks for the Campbell reference. It’s interesting that the WO was more worried about gliders and airlandings. I did get that impression from Gillies, actually, but it also seemed that the public fears were much more about paratroopers. I think they seemed more insidious somehow. Somewhat akin to ‘enemy in our midst’ spy fears from the pre-WWI period — paratroopers could drop from the sky and land anywhere, even your own backyard! And if nobody saw them land then they could potentially pretend to be one of us and do god knows what mischief. Whereas gliders and airlanded troops by their nature would be used more like regular units, to concentrate and capture objectives by force. Of course paratroopers would have been used like that too, but I’m not sure that the public understanding went that far.

]]> By: Dan http://airminded.org/2008/01/26/the-day-of-the-parashot/#comment-69865 Dan Wed, 06 Feb 2008 11:53:53 +0000 http://airminded.org/2008/01/26/the-day-of-the-parashot/#comment-69865 Well.... For me, one of the crucial things that you highlight here is the importance of chronology in understanding reactions to the crises of 1940. You're absolutely right that it all tends to get bundled together into one big event, and it's important to unpackage that if we want to appreciate the mixture of fear, panic, desperation and resolution with which Britons responded. John Campbell's article ‘Facing the German Airborne Threat to the United Kingdom, 1939-1942’, War in History 4, 4 (1997), 411-433 is quite good on this I think - he points out that since the British didn't have much experience of airborne warfare, even the War Office found it quite hard to judge how serious any German threat was. Whilst they assessed, reasonably accurately, the problems that would face any paratroop landing (dispersion, lack of heavy weapons, the need for air superiority), they were more concerned by the use of glider and airlanding forces. These seemed able to land more concentrated forces with less warning - and, it seemed, maybe even without that much specialist training. Here, I think, you can see the impact of the British intelligence failure over Scandinavia. The overestimation of German capabilities and planning took some time to get over. Well….
For me, one of the crucial things that you highlight here is the importance of chronology in understanding reactions to the crises of 1940. You’re absolutely right that it all tends to get bundled together into one big event, and it’s important to unpackage that if we want to appreciate the mixture of fear, panic, desperation and resolution with which Britons responded. John Campbell’s article ‘Facing the German Airborne Threat to the United Kingdom, 1939-1942’, War in History 4, 4 (1997), 411-433 is quite good on this I think - he points out that since the British didn’t have much experience of airborne warfare, even the War Office found it quite hard to judge how serious any German threat was. Whilst they assessed, reasonably accurately, the problems that would face any paratroop landing (dispersion, lack of heavy weapons, the need for air superiority), they were more concerned by the use of glider and airlanding forces. These seemed able to land more concentrated forces with less warning - and, it seemed, maybe even without that much specialist training. Here, I think, you can see the impact of the British intelligence failure over Scandinavia. The overestimation of German capabilities and planning took some time to get over.

]]> By: Jakob http://airminded.org/2008/01/26/the-day-of-the-parashot/#comment-69304 Jakob Tue, 29 Jan 2008 12:41:36 +0000 http://airminded.org/2008/01/26/the-day-of-the-parashot/#comment-69304 Was that Tom Gleave? So as well as being hideously burned, he then was shot on top of that? Frankly, any medal is warranted after that... Was that Tom Gleave? So as well as being hideously burned, he then was shot on top of that? Frankly, any medal is warranted after that…

]]> By: Brett Holman http://airminded.org/2008/01/26/the-day-of-the-parashot/#comment-69278 Brett Holman Tue, 29 Jan 2008 07:01:08 +0000 http://airminded.org/2008/01/26/the-day-of-the-parashot/#comment-69278 LOL, no I didn't know that! See, the system works. <blockquote>(…tries desperately not to write post-length comment…)</blockquote> Aw, come on, you know you want to ... LOL, no I didn’t know that! See, the system works.

(…tries desperately not to write post-length comment…)

Aw, come on, you know you want to …

]]> By: Dan http://airminded.org/2008/01/26/the-day-of-the-parashot/#comment-69255 Dan Mon, 28 Jan 2008 19:13:17 +0000 http://airminded.org/2008/01/26/the-day-of-the-parashot/#comment-69255 (...tries desperately not to write post-length comment...) Did you know the only Battle of Britain VC was shot by a Home Guardsman with a shotgun after he'd bailed out of his stricken plane? You probably did. That is definitely one for the 'I thought my day was bad but...' list. (…tries desperately not to write post-length comment…)

Did you know the only Battle of Britain VC was shot by a Home Guardsman with a shotgun after he’d bailed out of his stricken plane? You probably did. That is definitely one for the ‘I thought my day was bad but…’ list.

]]> By: Brett Holman http://airminded.org/2008/01/26/the-day-of-the-parashot/#comment-69075 Brett Holman Sat, 26 Jan 2008 04:07:53 +0000 http://airminded.org/2008/01/26/the-day-of-the-parashot/#comment-69075 Chris: No, I haven't, not lately anyway. It all sounds very Churchill. But I did come across a letter signed by Churchill (as Air Minister) at LHCMA. Not at all relevant to anything, but it made me think 'cool!' I previously thought that the rumours and myths of the Second World War couldn't match those of the First for variety or number. I'm starting to revise that opinion ... Gavin: I think I did see that when it came out. Sounds like fun. One thing I notice from Hayward's book is that the Army at home thought there were fifth columnists active in Britain -- evidence of sabotage and secret signaling to enemy aircraft, that sort of thing. Once the belief is held, all sorts of information is assimilated to it as confirmation, even mundane things which wouldn't raise an eyebrow outside of a war. The francs tireurs belief of the German armies invading Belgium in 1914 led to something similar. Browsing through S. P. Mackenzie's <em>The Home Guard</em> (on Google Books, is that cheating?), there were a number of similar schemes proposed as early as October 1939. But the Navy felt confident about its ability to deal with any invasion or raid so it was never felt necessary. There's a page missing in the Google Books preview which appears the decision itself, but the prospect of having to guard the huge number of potential targets behind the coast with regulars was clearly a strong motivation. Chris:

No, I haven’t, not lately anyway. It all sounds very Churchill. But I did come across a letter signed by Churchill (as Air Minister) at LHCMA. Not at all relevant to anything, but it made me think ‘cool!’

I previously thought that the rumours and myths of the Second World War couldn’t match those of the First for variety or number. I’m starting to revise that opinion …

Gavin:

I think I did see that when it came out. Sounds like fun. One thing I notice from Hayward’s book is that the Army at home thought there were fifth columnists active in Britain — evidence of sabotage and secret signaling to enemy aircraft, that sort of thing. Once the belief is held, all sorts of information is assimilated to it as confirmation, even mundane things which wouldn’t raise an eyebrow outside of a war. The francs tireurs belief of the German armies invading Belgium in 1914 led to something similar.

Browsing through S. P. Mackenzie’s The Home Guard (on Google Books, is that cheating?), there were a number of similar schemes proposed as early as October 1939. But the Navy felt confident about its ability to deal with any invasion or raid so it was never felt necessary. There’s a page missing in the Google Books preview which appears the decision itself, but the prospect of having to guard the huge number of potential targets behind the coast with regulars was clearly a strong motivation.

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