Wilson’s slant is interesting – it would apply to Messenger’s work for instance, as he concerned with the raising and training of the British Army and the battles are but mentioned only in their effect on that task.

I must have words with Professor Wilson when next I meet him – he lives in the same city as me (he moved here on his retirement) and I have run into him at various meetings. His collaborator Robin Prior is also here.

I thought academic writing was supposed to be laden with ifs, ands and buts, maybes and perhapses. Sometimes ambiguity is precision!

At first, my response was like yours, to say, “You what?”

But on mulling it, I have to ask what Kramer actually means by an ‘invasion of Britain,’ or rather, what kind of invasion? Does he mean a permanent occupation? Or an invasion as knockout blow?

With respect to the latter, there were discussions by various sections of the Admiralty Staff in 1896/97 of a number of Anglo-German war scenarios. Vague plans (maybe ‘plan’ is too strong a word) were made concerning landings along the Thames estuary, the destruction of port facilities, the landing of troops, even the shelling of London from the Thames, all seemingly with a view to knocking Britain out of any conflict by forcing her to early peace terms. These were all predicated on the idea that a limited but swift defeat of part of the Royal Navy would allow the invasion force to nip up the Thames before the bulk of the British fleet could recover and rally.

However, when Schlieffen was consulted, his reply was that it was pointless to entertain limited peace terms. Schlieffen also recognised that the Germans could only ever hope to defeat part of the British navy. His point was that an invading German army would have to land before the bulk of the Royal Navy could respond and ‘kneel on the chest of [its] prostrate enemy until he begs for mercy, for peace at any price’, that price to be the handing over of the entire British navy which, otherwise, would forever be a threat.

Now, it seems to me that between the lines, Schlieffen was highlighting a Catch-22 situation: in order to neutralise the British navy, it is necessary to invade Britain; but in order to invade Britain, it is necessary to neutralise the British navy. I wonder if he said what he said partly to stop the Admiralty Staff headbangers’ rash talk of invading Britain…

Back to Kramer… So perhaps he meant that a victorious Germany would ultimately invade Britain. Well, that’s always a fear, isn’t it? But it’s not the same as it being a foregone conclusion. And a Germanised Europe, with a crippled France eternally blazing with resentment at perfidious Albion’s desertion of her in her hour of need, was a sobering enough prospect for a British cabinet in 1914 without invoking unspecified future invasions.

Personally, I think Kramer’s comment is a rhetorical flourish, a throwaway remark not to be taken seriously. Just because it’s written in a book doesn’t make it true…

Anyway — nobody except Mike has commented on Kramer’s ‘what we know today’ (my fault for getting pedantic!) Am I missing something or is it a strange statement?

So unless the Pentagon has worked out updated warplans since then, the first sign we’ll have of a US attack upon Australia will be their construction of a huge fleet of pre-dreadnoughts …

“There’s the shoal water, and here are the leading marks on the hill. Once we anchor I’ll go ashore to report to the Ambassador. Now, Charles, how would you enfilade that battery on the point?”