Comments on: Sealion 1918 http://airminded.org/2007/12/14/sealion-1918/ Airpower and British society, 1908-1941 Fri, 29 Aug 2008 23:49:00 +0000 http://wordpress.org/?v=2.5.1 By: Brett Holman http://airminded.org/2007/12/14/sealion-1918/#comment-66622 Brett Holman Tue, 18 Dec 2007 14:28:35 +0000 http://airminded.org/2007/12/14/sealion-1918/#comment-66622 Could be! But to me, that's a problem in itself. I can't stand it when writers make stronger statements than they can possibly actually mean. It's bad enough when they obviously don't mean something literally (or don't understand what the word means ... like 'infinite'), but here it's more of a grey area. The way it's written, he could mean for it to be taken at face value. Or maybe he doesn't, but then why say it? I thought academic writing was supposed to be laden with ifs, ands and buts, maybes and perhapses. Sometimes ambiguity is precision! Could be! But to me, that’s a problem in itself. I can’t stand it when writers make stronger statements than they can possibly actually mean. It’s bad enough when they obviously don’t mean something literally (or don’t understand what the word means … like ‘infinite’), but here it’s more of a grey area. The way it’s written, he could mean for it to be taken at face value. Or maybe he doesn’t, but then why say it?

I thought academic writing was supposed to be laden with ifs, ands and buts, maybes and perhapses. Sometimes ambiguity is precision!

]]> By: Roger Todd http://airminded.org/2007/12/14/sealion-1918/#comment-66579 Roger Todd Mon, 17 Dec 2007 22:37:57 +0000 http://airminded.org/2007/12/14/sealion-1918/#comment-66579 "At the time, British decision-makers could only sense intuitively what we know today — this was far more than a conservative defence of the status quo: had Germany succeeded at the Marne in September 1914, which it almost did, the defeat of France and a separate peace would have been followed by a defeat of Russia and, after a pause to build up the German navy, the invasion of Britain from a position of towering strength on the Continent." At first, my response was like yours, to say, "You what?" But on mulling it, I have to ask what Kramer actually means by an 'invasion of Britain,' or rather, what kind of invasion? Does he mean a permanent occupation? Or an invasion as knockout blow? With respect to the latter, there were discussions by various sections of the Admiralty Staff in 1896/97 of a number of Anglo-German war scenarios. Vague plans (maybe 'plan' is too strong a word) were made concerning landings along the Thames estuary, the destruction of port facilities, the landing of troops, even the shelling of London from the Thames, all seemingly with a view to knocking Britain out of any conflict by forcing her to early peace terms. These were all predicated on the idea that a limited but swift defeat of part of the Royal Navy would allow the invasion force to nip up the Thames before the bulk of the British fleet could recover and rally. However, when Schlieffen was consulted, his reply was that it was pointless to entertain limited peace terms. Schlieffen also recognised that the Germans could only ever hope to defeat part of the British navy. His point was that an invading German army would have to land before the bulk of the Royal Navy could respond and 'kneel on the chest of [its] prostrate enemy until he begs for mercy, for peace at any price', that price to be the handing over of the entire British navy which, otherwise, would forever be a threat. Now, it seems to me that between the lines, Schlieffen was highlighting a Catch-22 situation: in order to neutralise the British navy, it is necessary to invade Britain; but in order to invade Britain, it is necessary to neutralise the British navy. I wonder if he said what he said partly to stop the Admiralty Staff headbangers' rash talk of invading Britain... Back to Kramer... So perhaps he meant that a victorious Germany would ultimately invade Britain. Well, that's always a fear, isn't it? But it's not the same as it being a foregone conclusion. And a Germanised Europe, with a crippled France eternally blazing with resentment at perfidious Albion's desertion of her in her hour of need, was a sobering enough prospect for a British cabinet in 1914 without invoking unspecified future invasions. Personally, I think Kramer's comment is a rhetorical flourish, a throwaway remark not to be taken seriously. Just because it's written in a book doesn't make it true... “At the time, British decision-makers could only sense intuitively what we know today — this was far more than a conservative defence of the status quo: had Germany succeeded at the Marne in September 1914, which it almost did, the defeat of France and a separate peace would have been followed by a defeat of Russia and, after a pause to build up the German navy, the invasion of Britain from a position of towering strength on the Continent.”

At first, my response was like yours, to say, “You what?”

But on mulling it, I have to ask what Kramer actually means by an ‘invasion of Britain,’ or rather, what kind of invasion? Does he mean a permanent occupation? Or an invasion as knockout blow?

With respect to the latter, there were discussions by various sections of the Admiralty Staff in 1896/97 of a number of Anglo-German war scenarios. Vague plans (maybe ‘plan’ is too strong a word) were made concerning landings along the Thames estuary, the destruction of port facilities, the landing of troops, even the shelling of London from the Thames, all seemingly with a view to knocking Britain out of any conflict by forcing her to early peace terms. These were all predicated on the idea that a limited but swift defeat of part of the Royal Navy would allow the invasion force to nip up the Thames before the bulk of the British fleet could recover and rally.

However, when Schlieffen was consulted, his reply was that it was pointless to entertain limited peace terms. Schlieffen also recognised that the Germans could only ever hope to defeat part of the British navy. His point was that an invading German army would have to land before the bulk of the Royal Navy could respond and ‘kneel on the chest of [its] prostrate enemy until he begs for mercy, for peace at any price’, that price to be the handing over of the entire British navy which, otherwise, would forever be a threat.

Now, it seems to me that between the lines, Schlieffen was highlighting a Catch-22 situation: in order to neutralise the British navy, it is necessary to invade Britain; but in order to invade Britain, it is necessary to neutralise the British navy. I wonder if he said what he said partly to stop the Admiralty Staff headbangers’ rash talk of invading Britain…

Back to Kramer… So perhaps he meant that a victorious Germany would ultimately invade Britain. Well, that’s always a fear, isn’t it? But it’s not the same as it being a foregone conclusion. And a Germanised Europe, with a crippled France eternally blazing with resentment at perfidious Albion’s desertion of her in her hour of need, was a sobering enough prospect for a British cabinet in 1914 without invoking unspecified future invasions.

Personally, I think Kramer’s comment is a rhetorical flourish, a throwaway remark not to be taken seriously. Just because it’s written in a book doesn’t make it true…

]]> By: Brett Holman http://airminded.org/2007/12/14/sealion-1918/#comment-66450 Brett Holman Sat, 15 Dec 2007 05:06:46 +0000 http://airminded.org/2007/12/14/sealion-1918/#comment-66450 I suppose armies aren't famous for their rational use of manpower, but presumably they were thought to be serving some purpose at home, or else they'd be released back into the workforce, so they weren't a drain on resources and, more importantly perhaps, free up other men to join up. Anyway -- nobody except Mike has commented on Kramer's 'what we know today' (my fault for getting pedantic!) Am I missing something or is it a strange statement? I suppose armies aren’t famous for their rational use of manpower, but presumably they were thought to be serving some purpose at home, or else they’d be released back into the workforce, so they weren’t a drain on resources and, more importantly perhaps, free up other men to join up.

Anyway — nobody except Mike has commented on Kramer’s ‘what we know today’ (my fault for getting pedantic!) Am I missing something or is it a strange statement?

]]> By: Gavin Robinson http://airminded.org/2007/12/14/sealion-1918/#comment-66422 Gavin Robinson Fri, 14 Dec 2007 16:26:49 +0000 http://airminded.org/2007/12/14/sealion-1918/#comment-66422 Whatever home service men were supposed to be for, they might not all have been very effective if they were called on to act. From what I know about the Royal Defence Corps it seems to have been composed of men who weren't fit for front line combat, but not quite bad enough to be discharged completely. Of course the two regular divisions in 1914 would have been a different matter but things probably went downhill as the war went on. Whatever home service men were supposed to be for, they might not all have been very effective if they were called on to act. From what I know about the Royal Defence Corps it seems to have been composed of men who weren’t fit for front line combat, but not quite bad enough to be discharged completely. Of course the two regular divisions in 1914 would have been a different matter but things probably went downhill as the war went on.

]]> By: Brett Holman http://airminded.org/2007/12/14/sealion-1918/#comment-66418 Brett Holman Fri, 14 Dec 2007 14:40:10 +0000 http://airminded.org/2007/12/14/sealion-1918/#comment-66418 LOL, I'm sure; but in this case they were ordered to do so before leaving on their voyage, to write them down and, upon their return to the US, file them with the Department of the Navy. Which they did. There's a paper by James R. Reckner about the plans in a conference proceedings: David Stevens and John Reeve, eds. <em>Southern Trident: Strategy, History and the Rise of Australian Naval Power</em> (Crows Nest: Allen & Unwin, 2001) So unless the Pentagon has worked out updated warplans since then, the first sign we'll have of a US attack upon Australia will be their construction of a huge fleet of pre-dreadnoughts ... LOL, I’m sure; but in this case they were ordered to do so before leaving on their voyage, to write them down and, upon their return to the US, file them with the Department of the Navy. Which they did. There’s a paper by James R. Reckner about the plans in a conference proceedings: David Stevens and John Reeve, eds. Southern Trident: Strategy, History and the Rise of Australian Naval Power (Crows Nest: Allen & Unwin, 2001)

So unless the Pentagon has worked out updated warplans since then, the first sign we’ll have of a US attack upon Australia will be their construction of a huge fleet of pre-dreadnoughts …

]]> By: Chris Williams http://airminded.org/2007/12/14/sealion-1918/#comment-66417 Chris Williams Fri, 14 Dec 2007 14:27:49 +0000 http://airminded.org/2007/12/14/sealion-1918/#comment-66417 Isn't that just the sort of thing that naval officers just did unconsciously, like noting the sailing characteristics of a ship? "There's the shoal water, and here are the leading marks on the hill. Once we anchor I'll go ashore to report to the Ambassador. Now, Charles, how would you enfilade that battery on the point?" Isn’t that just the sort of thing that naval officers just did unconsciously, like noting the sailing characteristics of a ship?

“There’s the shoal water, and here are the leading marks on the hill. Once we anchor I’ll go ashore to report to the Ambassador. Now, Charles, how would you enfilade that battery on the point?”

]]> By: Brett Holman http://airminded.org/2007/12/14/sealion-1918/#comment-66398 Brett Holman Fri, 14 Dec 2007 10:51:13 +0000 http://airminded.org/2007/12/14/sealion-1918/#comment-66398 Yes, I've read that article. As you say it's not quite the same thing as an intention to invade ... though perhaps I should have chosen my words better, since technically they did plan to invade! IIRC this was late 1890s or early 1900s; it's hard to believe it was much more than a planning exercise, given the disparity between the navies at that time. They can't have hoped they'd get the chance to use it! The officers of the Great White Fleet developed plans to invade Australia and New Zealand when they visited this part of the world; which was probably somewhat impolite given the warm welcome they were given, but their plans were about as likely to be put into effect as the German plan was ... Yes, I’ve read that article. As you say it’s not quite the same thing as an intention to invade … though perhaps I should have chosen my words better, since technically they did plan to invade! IIRC this was late 1890s or early 1900s; it’s hard to believe it was much more than a planning exercise, given the disparity between the navies at that time. They can’t have hoped they’d get the chance to use it!

The officers of the Great White Fleet developed plans to invade Australia and New Zealand when they visited this part of the world; which was probably somewhat impolite given the warm welcome they were given, but their plans were about as likely to be put into effect as the German plan was …

]]> By: Alan Allport http://airminded.org/2007/12/14/sealion-1918/#comment-66394 Alan Allport Fri, 14 Dec 2007 09:41:38 +0000 http://airminded.org/2007/12/14/sealion-1918/#comment-66394 <i>You’re absolutely right that Germany never planned to invade Britain</i> Well, there was *a* contingency plan to invade Britain (which I realize is not quite the same thing) in the early years of William II's reign: see Paul Kennedy's article <i>The Development of German Naval Operations: Plans against England, 1896-1914</i>, originally in the EHR. But Tirpitz was hostile to the idea and once the Dreadnought race began it was relegated to the archives permanently. You’re absolutely right that Germany never planned to invade Britain

Well, there was *a* contingency plan to invade Britain (which I realize is not quite the same thing) in the early years of William II’s reign: see Paul Kennedy’s article The Development of German Naval Operations: Plans against England, 1896-1914, originally in the EHR. But Tirpitz was hostile to the idea and once the Dreadnought race began it was relegated to the archives permanently.

]]> By: Brett Holman http://airminded.org/2007/12/14/sealion-1918/#comment-66391 Brett Holman Fri, 14 Dec 2007 09:10:23 +0000 http://airminded.org/2007/12/14/sealion-1918/#comment-66391 Oh, there's no question about the beard. I think we can all agree on the beard. Interesting about the deployment of the home army -- that's plausible. I was thinking the 2 BEF divisions might also have been held back in case Ireland flared up, but I couldn't find anything to support that. Oh, there’s no question about the beard. I think we can all agree on the beard.

Interesting about the deployment of the home army — that’s plausible. I was thinking the 2 BEF divisions might also have been held back in case Ireland flared up, but I couldn’t find anything to support that.

]]> By: Chris Williams http://airminded.org/2007/12/14/sealion-1918/#comment-66386 Chris Williams Fri, 14 Dec 2007 08:50:27 +0000 http://airminded.org/2007/12/14/sealion-1918/#comment-66386 Brock Milman has suggested that if you look at the deployment of the army at home during WW1, you have to conclude that many/most of them were there to guard against industrial unrest, not invasion. As for Tirpitz, I'm under the impression that he wanted to build as many ships as possible, and the exact justification tended to shift over time. I'm not sure about the 'bleed 'em dry' theory (which I don't think that Reagan ever articulated either, come to that): if only because the Kaiserreich was engaged in an army race with the Entente. Starting up a naval race with Britain - otherwise a far more obvious ally for Germany - has to be one of the nineteenth-century's Top Ten Brain-Dead Strategic Decisions. Good beard, though. Brock Milman has suggested that if you look at the deployment of the army at home during WW1, you have to conclude that many/most of them were there to guard against industrial unrest, not invasion.

As for Tirpitz, I’m under the impression that he wanted to build as many ships as possible, and the exact justification tended to shift over time. I’m not sure about the ‘bleed ‘em dry’ theory (which I don’t think that Reagan ever articulated either, come to that): if only because the Kaiserreich was engaged in an army race with the Entente. Starting up a naval race with Britain - otherwise a far more obvious ally for Germany - has to be one of the nineteenth-century’s Top Ten Brain-Dead Strategic Decisions.

Good beard, though.

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