Comments on: The Cuzaux effect. Cazaux. Whatever http://airminded.org/2006/03/02/the-cuzaux-effect/ Airpower and British society, 1908-1941 Sun, 12 Oct 2008 05:16:08 +0000 http://wordpress.org/?v=2.6.1 By: Alex http://airminded.org/2006/03/02/the-cuzaux-effect/#comment-379 Alex Thu, 09 Mar 2006 11:09:08 +0000 http://airminded.org/2006/03/02/the-cuzaux-effect/#comment-379 That depends on the assumptions that go into setting up the exercise - if the "opposing" fighters are using the same tactics, the results will be of little use. One reason it survived, I think, was the utility of all that formation flying as training. That depends on the assumptions that go into setting up the exercise - if the “opposing” fighters are using the same tactics, the results will be of little use.

One reason it survived, I think, was the utility of all that formation flying as training.

]]> By: Brett Holman http://airminded.org/2006/03/02/the-cuzaux-effect/#comment-377 Brett Holman Thu, 09 Mar 2006 04:29:20 +0000 http://airminded.org/2006/03/02/the-cuzaux-effect/#comment-377 Granted, but what I mean is, even in the absence of operational experience, why couldn't operational research methods have been used by the RAF to weed out the less sensible tactics? I would have thought that exercises would have shown that, for example, the wingmen in a vic were expending far too much effort keeping in formation, and not enough watching out for the enemy. Granted, but what I mean is, even in the absence of operational experience, why couldn’t operational research methods have been used by the RAF to weed out the less sensible tactics? I would have thought that exercises would have shown that, for example, the wingmen in a vic were expending far too much effort keeping in formation, and not enough watching out for the enemy.

]]> By: Alex http://airminded.org/2006/03/02/the-cuzaux-effect/#comment-373 Alex Wed, 08 Mar 2006 10:34:24 +0000 http://airminded.org/2006/03/02/the-cuzaux-effect/#comment-373 Partly because the Germans had a live try-out in Spain, which is where the schwarm/finger-4 was invented. In one of the standard BoB works, there's a nice anecdote about some bureaucratic imbecile who turned up at Hornchurch in late August, 1940 to demand why Al Deere's squadron didn't have their guns harmonised as laid down in the book. Partly because the Germans had a live try-out in Spain, which is where the schwarm/finger-4 was invented.

In one of the standard BoB works, there’s a nice anecdote about some bureaucratic imbecile who turned up at Hornchurch in late August, 1940 to demand why Al Deere’s squadron didn’t have their guns harmonised as laid down in the book.

]]> By: Brett Holman http://airminded.org/2006/03/02/the-cuzaux-effect/#comment-369 Brett Holman Tue, 07 Mar 2006 10:50:01 +0000 http://airminded.org/2006/03/02/the-cuzaux-effect/#comment-369 Thanks, Alex. I always find it difficult to understand why it was so hard to evolve more sensible tactics in peacetime. Obviously there's nothing like a real war to hurry things up, but surely there was a lot that could be learnt from exercises, gun cameras and aerial targets. Thanks, Alex. I always find it difficult to understand why it was so hard to evolve more sensible tactics in peacetime. Obviously there’s nothing like a real war to hurry things up, but surely there was a lot that could be learnt from exercises, gun cameras and aerial targets.

]]> By: Alex http://airminded.org/2006/03/02/the-cuzaux-effect/#comment-366 Alex Sun, 05 Mar 2006 12:28:44 +0000 http://airminded.org/2006/03/02/the-cuzaux-effect/#comment-366 In the Anglosphere, a crucial point about aerial gunnery was that the ranges involved were systematically overestimated for years. RAF fighter tactics were based on an expected range of 400 yards and this was worked into the codified set of Fighting Area Attacks, a sort of drillbook approach to air combat. Attack No.1 had a section of fighters follow their leader in line astern up to a bomber, and take it in turns to shoot before breaking off in a 120 degree turn. (Think: similar to the coordinated break that you see in every movie involving fighters, where the aircraft turn away showing their bellies to the camera.) In practice this was unworkable - it didn't help that the break involved presenting a very large target with little relative momentum to any air gunner on the target for several seconds, either. In the test of action, RAF Fighter Command rapidly junked it and appropriated the German schwarm/rotte formations and greater independence of action. This was all based on the principle that engagement was likely at much shorter ranges and hence that a stable gun platform was less important. Further, most squadrons had re-zeroed their guns from the officially prescribed 400 yard harmonisation to 250 yards by the end of the Dunkirk campaign (although the bureaucracy took a while longer to soak this up) In the Anglosphere, a crucial point about aerial gunnery was that the ranges involved were systematically overestimated for years. RAF fighter tactics were based on an expected range of 400 yards and this was worked into the codified set of Fighting Area Attacks, a sort of drillbook approach to air combat. Attack No.1 had a section of fighters follow their leader in line astern up to a bomber, and take it in turns to shoot before breaking off in a 120 degree turn.

(Think: similar to the coordinated break that you see in every movie involving fighters, where the aircraft turn away showing their bellies to the camera.) In practice this was unworkable - it didn’t help that the break involved presenting a very large target with little relative momentum to any air gunner on the target for several seconds, either.

In the test of action, RAF Fighter Command rapidly junked it and appropriated the German schwarm/rotte formations and greater independence of action. This was all based on the principle that engagement was likely at much shorter ranges and hence that a stable gun platform was less important. Further, most squadrons had re-zeroed their guns from the officially prescribed 400 yard harmonisation to 250 yards by the end of the Dunkirk campaign (although the bureaucracy took a while longer to soak this up)

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