Comments on: The bolt from the blue and the knock-out blow http://airminded.org/2006/02/23/the-bolt-from-the-blue-and-the-knock-out-blow/ Airpower and British society, 1908-1941 Sat, 21 Nov 2009 04:15:39 -0700 http://wordpress.org/?v=2.8.6 hourly 1 By: Brett Holman http://airminded.org/2006/02/23/the-bolt-from-the-blue-and-the-knock-out-blow/comment-page-1/#comment-361 Brett Holman Mon, 27 Feb 2006 16:56:30 +0000 http://airminded.org/2006/02/23/the-bolt-from-the-blue-and-the-knock-out-blow/#comment-361 Sure, but I was talking about the post-war British navy, not the pre-war German one. I suspect that British destroyers were much more likely to be used for dull (but vital) convoy work than dashing torpedo attacks against the enemy battlefleet! Sure, but I was talking about the post-war British navy, not the pre-war German one. I suspect that British destroyers were much more likely to be used for dull (but vital) convoy work than dashing torpedo attacks against the enemy battlefleet!

]]> By: Alex http://airminded.org/2006/02/23/the-bolt-from-the-blue-and-the-knock-out-blow/comment-page-1/#comment-360 Alex Mon, 27 Feb 2006 12:47:29 +0000 http://airminded.org/2006/02/23/the-bolt-from-the-blue-and-the-knock-out-blow/#comment-360 Destroyers less glamorous than battleships? Tell that to von Hipper's young men with their torpedo beards. Certainly submarines (and also destroyers/torpedo boats and mines) were seen as part of a naval "bolt from the blue/bolt from the grey" scenario - the dominant idea being that the Grand Fleet would be drawn into some kind of hellish ambush as the invaders sailed. This actually had some consequences for real strategy; the Churchill/Fisher policy of distant blockade with the big navy at Scapa Flow and a mass of destroyers and subs at Harwich and in the Dover Strait was essentially a measure of security against it. Destroyers less glamorous than battleships? Tell that to von Hipper’s young men with their torpedo beards. Certainly submarines (and also destroyers/torpedo boats and mines) were seen as part of a naval “bolt from the blue/bolt from the grey” scenario – the dominant idea being that the Grand Fleet would be drawn into some kind of hellish ambush as the invaders sailed.

This actually had some consequences for real strategy; the Churchill/Fisher policy of distant blockade with the big navy at Scapa Flow and a mass of destroyers and subs at Harwich and in the Dover Strait was essentially a measure of security against it.

]]> By: Brett Holman http://airminded.org/2006/02/23/the-bolt-from-the-blue-and-the-knock-out-blow/comment-page-1/#comment-359 Brett Holman Sat, 25 Feb 2006 07:26:11 +0000 http://airminded.org/2006/02/23/the-bolt-from-the-blue-and-the-knock-out-blow/#comment-359 I wonder if admirals and navalists weren't also partly responsible ... destroyers being so much less glamorous than battleships. But I don't know much about naval propaganda between the wars, so that may be unfair. I wonder if admirals and navalists weren’t also partly responsible … destroyers being so much less glamorous than battleships. But I don’t know much about naval propaganda between the wars, so that may be unfair.

]]> By: Chris Williams http://airminded.org/2006/02/23/the-bolt-from-the-blue-and-the-knock-out-blow/comment-page-1/#comment-356 Chris Williams Fri, 24 Feb 2006 10:08:57 +0000 http://airminded.org/2006/02/23/the-bolt-from-the-blue-and-the-knock-out-blow/#comment-356 It is weird, isn't it? Both problems were solved by 1918: the former by an air defence system, the latter by convoys. I suppose it's a case of things only mattering if they happen in (or in this case over) London. The submarine war was a long way away, and the food never actually ran out. I blame the RAF, as usual, for fixating on the knock-out blow. You're right about Le Vengeur - on the other hand, any new way to defeat the Channel Fleet automatically opens the country up to the Battle of Dorking. It is weird, isn’t it? Both problems were solved by 1918: the former by an air defence system, the latter by convoys. I suppose it’s a case of things only mattering if they happen in (or in this case over) London. The submarine war was a long way away, and the food never actually ran out. I blame the RAF, as usual, for fixating on the knock-out blow.

You’re right about Le Vengeur – on the other hand, any new way to defeat the Channel Fleet automatically opens the country up to the Battle of Dorking.

]]> By: Brett Holman http://airminded.org/2006/02/23/the-bolt-from-the-blue-and-the-knock-out-blow/comment-page-1/#comment-355 Brett Holman Fri, 24 Feb 2006 05:04:07 +0000 http://airminded.org/2006/02/23/the-bolt-from-the-blue-and-the-knock-out-blow/#comment-355 My impression is that submarines were generally not thought of in the context of a guerre de course, but as equalizers to be used against battleships and the like. Certainly in "The raid of Le Vengeur", the sub is used to sink a British cruiser. So subs were just another battlefield weapon, not a way of getting at the soft civilian underbelly. As for courses de guerre more generally (like the jeune ecole), as I said I think they are related to the knock-out blow; I would say they quantitatively different (much slower, taking months or years rather than days or weeks) as well as qualitatively different (not attacking civilians directly). These possibly help explain why after WWI, attention was focused on the threat from the bomber rather than the submarine ... but I still find that curious, given 1917. Seems like something they forgot to remember! My impression is that submarines were generally not thought of in the context of a guerre de course, but as equalizers to be used against battleships and the like. Certainly in “The raid of Le Vengeur”, the sub is used to sink a British cruiser. So subs were just another battlefield weapon, not a way of getting at the soft civilian underbelly.

As for courses de guerre more generally (like the jeune ecole), as I said I think they are related to the knock-out blow; I would say they quantitatively different (much slower, taking months or years rather than days or weeks) as well as qualitatively different (not attacking civilians directly). These possibly help explain why after WWI, attention was focused on the threat from the bomber rather than the submarine … but I still find that curious, given 1917. Seems like something they forgot to remember!

]]> By: Chris Williams http://airminded.org/2006/02/23/the-bolt-from-the-blue-and-the-knock-out-blow/comment-page-1/#comment-354 Chris Williams Thu, 23 Feb 2006 09:49:54 +0000 http://airminded.org/2006/02/23/the-bolt-from-the-blue-and-the-knock-out-blow/#comment-354 We could go back andf back, but what about the reaction (if any) in the UK to the jeune ecole inside the French navy in the C19th? And what about the knock-out blow delivered via the submarine? ObSF here is _The Raid of Le Vengeur_, which IIRC was re-printed in one of the collections that Michael Moorcock edited, either _Before Armageddon_ or _England Invaded_. We could go back andf back, but what about the reaction (if any) in the UK to the jeune ecole inside the French navy in the C19th?

And what about the knock-out blow delivered via the submarine? ObSF here is _The Raid of Le Vengeur_, which IIRC was re-printed in one of the collections that Michael Moorcock edited, either _Before Armageddon_ or _England Invaded_.

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